



ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS

of the

GUYANA DEFENCE FORCE

Produced by the
Strategic Review Working Group
Under the Office of
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Chief of Staff
Guyana Defence Force

RESTRICTED

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



RESTRICTED

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About the Cover:

- Vertical strip of emblems representing some of the units of the Guyana Defence Force
- Symbol representing the authority of the Guyana Defence Force
- Image simulating organisational structure of some major units of the Guyana Defence Force

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Introduction

The organisational analysis of the Guyana Defence Force was conducted using the elements of organisational analysis (external / internal and operational environment). The programmes, outputs, results and recommendations of this analysis are designed to meet the short to long term and strategic goals of the Guyana Defence Force.

In the context of the organisational analysis, the vision envisaged the development of a modern Armed Force with specialised and distinct branches of service to include an Army, Air and Naval units with a Chairman and Staff who would coordinate these branches under the general direction of a Defence Minister having regard to the necessity for Parliamentary scrutiny and oversight of military budgets and expenditure effectively reducing political partisanship and perceptions of interference.

To achieve this vision, a number of intermediate and strategic goals have to be met. These include:

Immediate Goals

- Restoring organisational morale, rebuilding public trust and earning the respect and confidence of our citizenry and civil administration.
- Depoliticising the army and nurturing a culture of apolitical professionalism with loyalty to the Constitution of Guyana and the government of the day.
- Review of national defence priorities relating to the integrity of our national borders and sea space.
- Development of the Military Criminal Intelligence Department ((MCID) as a national security/intelligence/agency to provide criminal intelligence to support joint operations with the police and other law enforcement agencies.
- Development of the G5 and G 6 staff branches to expand military output.
- Develop and maintain a posture that affords adequate responses to civil disasters and youth development.
- Establish a positive command climate as the basis for reversal of negative trends and cultivating a new culture of openness, harmonious relations with government, civil society and the professional discharge of the organisation's missions.
- Revisit and establish formal manual/guidelines for the Joint Services concept and reaffirm support for and improve mechanisms of Joint Services cooperation in all areas with particular emphasis on internal stabilisation and security among coastal communities.
- Support for regional, hemispheric and international security initiatives.
- Development of the Research and Development (R & D) branch to provide for expert evaluation and corresponding quality purchases.
- Establish an Inspectorate Department to police, monitor and provide feedback on task executions of operational and logistic command, and organisational development.

Strategic Goals*These include*

- The development of a military capability comparable to at least one of our neighbouring countries.
- Acquisition of naval platforms for force projection and enforcement of national laws in the territorial sea and EEZ.
- Development of a reliable defence and security capability to provide for surveillance, detection and interdiction operations.
- Development of significant offensive capability (Air, Naval and Army) to deter aggression.
- Development of a highly skilled and educated Officer and Other Ranks Corps.
- Development of a highly skilled and motivated Reserve Force to support the Regular Force.
- Development of a Regular and Reserve Force that earns the respect of the people.
- Development of strategic and statecraft partnerships with state, non state and foreign military in order to exponentially enhance human and material development.
- Defend national independence, preserve sovereignty, and intensify and guarantee the normal functioning of installations and the security of the nation against any armed aggression.
- Defend the country's democratic system of governance.

The organisational analysis was shaped by a number of external and internal factors inclusive of the international and regional environment, national values and interests, national threats and other security initiatives, all of which recognise the dynamics of the international and regional geopolitical environment. To this end, the Guyana Defence Force will continue to forge bilateral relations in the interest of the nation through a number of strategic, operational and other initiatives.

Nationally, the Guyana Defence Force will support the Local Law Enforcement efforts aimed at providing an enabling security environment, inclusive of the air, land and sea sphere, conducive to national development and economic growth.

The organisational analysis was cognisant of the development of the National Security strategy and the need for the continuous refinement of tactical and strategic responses to national defence and security. The end state; the development of strategies to neutralise the external and internal threats inimical to the security interest of Guyana.

The analysis provides for the Guyana Defence Force to address issues relating to National Search and Recue capability, both air and sea. It also addresses the competency to support and supplement the Civil Defence Commission in national emergencies, and the continuity of Hearts and Minds programmes in hinterland, coastal and urban communities.

Additionally, the Force will sustain efforts to reduce and arrest deviant criminal acts by serving members against the civilian population and increase counter-drug operations.

The analysis also recommends the need for cordial and harmonious relations between the military and the civil administration. Submission to civilian oversight as provided for in the Defence Act, to reduce loss, waste, and improve accountability and transparency within the organisation. The Force also recognises the need to engage the civilian administration in efforts to improve quality of life issues for members of the Guyana Defence Force.

A revisit of the decision to direct all training and employment matters previously dealt with by the Chief of Staff, to the Defence Board, will be considered a positive step in the rebuilding of civil-military relations. More importantly, the regular and continuous interactions between the Commander in Chief and the senior leadership of the Force and partnerships with Government Ministries and other State and non-State actors will enhance this rebuilding process.

The regeneration of professional standards and increasing institutional capacity, the establishment of an Inspectorate and a Research and Development Departments which will conduct doctrinal reviews, testing and sampling of kit and equipment, provide advice on procurement, conduct impartial inspections of units along with increased levels of competitiveness among units of the Force will be positive in the context of regeneration of professional standards and increasing institutional capacity.

The recapitalisation of the Force, reorganisation and expansion to maximise on available human resources, and the increased employment of combat multipliers through training in modern technologies is inevitable for the Force's development.

The networking and leveraging with organisations, both internal and external, in the pursuit of its mission, the maintenance of symbiotic relationships with other agencies and Amerindian communities in the area of information gathering will continue to supplement the intelligence process.

The external and internal linkages are also critical as they span several bilaterals and associations such as intelligence sharing and cooperation with Brazil. It was recognised that there was a need to develop such linkages with Suriname and Venezuela including the establishment and maintenance of Defence Attaché structures within these countries to act as the nation's Defence diplomatic front, creating at the same time an environment of détente on our borders.

The foreign military training assistance programmes, when analysed, were found to be a critical influence on the Force's professionalism. The continuance of these bilaterals with foreign armies inclusive of the USA, UK, Canada, India, Brazil, China, French Guiana, RSS and other CARICOM countries is therefore

recommended.

A deliberate study of the Force's organisational structure indicated that it primarily focused on ranks and appointments of our human resource personnel. Its core product is the Force's Establishment. This document simply summarises the ranks of the Force against the organisational structure. It is a tool that allows knowledge of quantities as it relates to personnel.

The nature of this type of establishment denudes the Force of critical information necessary for its human resource development and excludes information relating to: skill sets for Officers and Other Ranks, weapons of all types, equipment of all types, vehicles, aircraft and vessels.

The Force's establishment must be able to reflect a total projection of the organisation's requirements. It must be flexible and ready to satisfy peace as well as combat expectations.

Internal training revolved around the concept of identifying ranks to rotate through Training Corps for a specified period. Selected ranks undergo a Staff Training module that sharpens their instructor's skills rather than for them to become qualified instructors and prepare them adequately to train courses. Therefore, ranks on completion of Staff Training must accumulate a specified number of training hours under frequent and certified supervision by Training Corps.

In the past, the concept that drove our training needs of producing a 'Multidimensional soldier' was found to be expensive as it required spending more training dollars on one soldier to produce a crack trooper. The funds were spent but with less than desired expectations and results. The underpinning philosophy in the new training concept is training should be role specific as against the traditional 'multidimensional soldier' concept.

The new training concept includes academic educational programmes organised in a phased and tiered manner to prepare Force members to complete CXC level and promotion examinations. This will result in increased attendance by Officers and Other Ranks at tertiary institutions. A Force training doctrine will be produced which addresses all aspects of training in the short and long term.

The GDF, as a public entity, receives most of its revenue based on allocations in the national budget. The Force's budget from 1985 was slashed under the nebulous concept of 'an affordable army' introduced by the previous government. The cuts were based on guidelines set by the International Monetary Fund and other multi-national lending institutions that financed the Economic Recovery Programme. The reduced spending policy set a cap on recurrent and capital expenditure, which affected emoluments and other maintenance costs and consequently reduced numbers.

Capital budget allocations over the period 1989-2000 reflected less than 1% of

national allocations. This affected the Force's ability to recapitalise and acquire new equipment. These allocations were also eroded by reduced dollar rates against the US dollar (devaluation) and rising prices (inflation). Consequently, there were reductions in several programmes including training. However, the Force saw a marked increase in budgetary allocations in 2008 due to the violent crime situation which served as an impetus for the purchase and upgrade of aircraft and vessels.

The hire of transport continues to be a contentious and hotly debated issue. While the Force has a few trucks of its own, request to recapitalise land transport under 'capital' has been repeatedly denied leading to hire of vehicles under 'current.' The absence of organic transportation acts as a 'combat divider' and places the Force at risk in the pursuit of its mission. The issue of confidentiality and surprise are often sacrificed or ignored. The Guyana Defence Force must return to owning its own fleet of land transport which will also act as a Force multiplier in the execution of its missions.

The re-capitalisation of the Force is essential to achieve increases in air, land and maritime mobility which are crucial to the Force's defence policy of defining aggression. Part of the defence policy must include parity of defence capability with at least one of Guyana's neighbours.

The Defence Board must see this as a productive endeavour as it also provides the necessary support mechanisms for the Force to operate in support of the Guyana Police Force. Guyana's development will ultimately depend on a secure Guyana and the Force stands to make that a reality so long as it is afforded finances to capitalise over the short to medium term.

The Force currently manages its finances through a centralised system which is considered less efficient. The de-centralisation of the financial and logistical systems being implemented promises greater management in the preparation and execution of the Force's capital and current expenditure projects.

The challenges to the organisation are formidable and include the following;

Perceptions of Politicisation of the Military

The Guyana Defence Force continues to uphold an apolitical image in face of unfounded criticisms.

Ethnic Balance

The ethnic balance of the Force continues to attract discussions and debates in society.

Political Instability

Guyana's democracy is challenged by periodic fallouts between Government and Opposition members on issues relating to the Security Forces.

Mission Creep

This is a euphemistic expression given by the military to the extension of missions without corresponding increases in resource allocation.

Budget

The Force's budget influenced the behavior of the GDF in the past and had a severe and debilitating effect. The absence of re-capitalisation continues to be a concern.

Socio-economic Factors. Education System.

The Force's Human Resource investment is influenced by the influx of potential members. A pressured national education system continues to pose challenges to this organisation.

Health Care.

As health care becomes more expensive in the society and with significant challenges to the health care system as a whole, the Guyana Defence Force which seeks to recruit young, healthy adults will be faced with human resource challenges if the numbers of persons fit for military service nationally is further reduced.

Force Retention.

High levels of retention over the past years and unchecked promotions resulted in a bottleneck at the top of the organisational structure. This led to increased competition, conflict and reduced esprit de corps.

Recommendations

The following programmes are recommended to satisfy the short and long term goals of the Guyana Defence Force:

- Review and update existing threat assessments relevant to our border nations.
- Review existing posture, operations on the border and associated manpower and physical assets.
- Develop strategies in association with other Law Enforcement agencies to combat trafficking of drugs and guns entering the country through open borders.
- Expand operations on major rivers, waterways, territorial sea and the EEZ to reduce illicit activities and maintain sovereignty.
- Conduct a strategic defence review. Review of protocols and contingency plans to support the police and prison services in emergencies.
- Assessment of existing coastal locations/bases and development of Forward Operating bases with Quick Reaction Forces to support police and suppress serious armed criminal activity.
- Employment of MCID to develop intelligence related to the recovery of the missing AK 47 rifles. MCID will also complement the Police SB/CID as a national intelligence/investigative body.

- Development of coordinated and joint strategy to combat and effectively eradicate piracy on major rivers and coastal areas.
- Continuation of support for law enforcement activity related to smuggling of fuel and trafficking in persons
- Develop capacity as the national search and rescue agency.
- Develop capacity to support and supplement the CDC in national emergencies.
- Conduct hearts and minds programmes in hinterland, coastal villages and urban communities.
- Sustain efforts to reduce and arrest deviant and criminal acts by serving members against the civilian population.
- Counter drugs operations in support of Law Enforcement Agencies.
- Renouncing the adversarial approach to civil-military relations.
- Commitment to reduce loss and waste and to improve accountability and transparency.
- Commitment to improving the quality of life for military members through better pay and conditions of service.
- Requesting the cessation of stringent control measures and return of authority once exercised by the Chief of Staff to the Defence Force.
- Maintaining regular and continuous interaction between the CIC and senior leadership of the Force.
- Regular hosting of Defence Board meetings with major inputs from the Defence Force in the development of the agenda.
- Improved screening of new entrants and continuous vetting of ranks over their period of service.
- Development of an effective Military Police company as a necessary instrument of the personnel services branch of the Force.
- Review of the scales of punishment and system of correction for deviant soldiers.
- Development of additional compliance mechanisms to provide for impartial inspection and reporting of units.
- Increasing levels of competitiveness among units of the Force (drill, skill at arms, military knowledge, first aid, discipline reports and attendance).
- Re-stocking of front line and training munitions consistent with weapon systems and replacement of ammunition (field artillery) destroyed during the explosion at Camp Groomes.
- Acquisition of secure and reliable communication equipment and the integration of combat net radio and computer systems to improve command and control. This is particularly relevant now in the context of small team operations on the coast in support of law enforcement.
- Staffing of training and front line units with the best personnel available.
- Promotion of a rewards based system for upward mobility and growth.
- Increase the “teeth to tail” ratios (warriors: logisticians).
- Minimise civilian employment, reduce recruitment of women and prohibit re-enlistment of retirees.
- Increase the strength and capability of the Coast Guard.
- Bring existing combat arms, combat support and combat service support units

up to their approved strength.

- Establish a second regular battalion
- Redrafting of guidelines and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
- Strict compliance with SOPs.
- Development of personnel management systems that are based on merit and performance standards.
- Revitalising of partnerships and intelligence/information sharing meetings including the RICs.
- Revitalising of the 2 Infantry Battalion (Reserve) with the active involvement of regional authorities.
- A renewed effort to promote dialogue and information exchange with the Suriname and Venezuelan national Armies.
- Removal of the financial impediment that affected the acceptance of skill and command courses offered by the Brazilian Military.
- Re-negotiation of the per diem allowance for attendance on military courses and related duty overseas.
- Continued reliance on foreign Subject Matter Experts and Exchanges to build local training capability.
- Investment in the development of the Training Corps as a center of excellence and regional training institution for Officers and NCO courses.
- Commitment to another UN mission overseas. This would raise the profile of the organisation as a troop contributing country and qualify serving Officers to fill future posts in UN DPKO.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AEP	Academic Education Programme
CANU	Customs Anti Narcotics Unit
CAW	CARICOM Arrest Warrant
CHDS	Centre for Hemispheric Defence Studies
CDC	Civil Defence Commission
COPACS	CARICOM Operations, Planning and Coordinating Staff
CSCS	Caribbean Security Cooperation System
CSRA	CARICOM Ship Rider Agreement
DCA	Direct Commercial Sales
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
E-IMET	Enhanced International Military Education and Training
ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	European Union
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
G1	General Branch 1 – Personnel and Administration
G2	General Branch 2 – Intelligence and Security
G3	General Branch 3 – Operations and Training
G4	General Branch 4 – Finance and Logistics
G5	General Branch 5 – Civil Affairs
G6	General Branch 6 – Information Technology and Communication
GGDMA	Guyana Gold and Diamond Miners Association
GGMC	Guyana Geology and Mines Commission
HCA	Humanitarian and Civic Assistance programme
IMET	International Military Education and Training
ICC	International Criminal Court
MANB	Maritime Anti Narcotics Bill
MCAA	Maritime Cooperation Airspace Agreement
MCID	Military Criminal Intelligence Department
MCA	Maritime Cooperation Agreement
MLO	Military Liaison Officer
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OECS	Organisation of Eastern Caribbean State
RIC	Regional Intelligence Committee
RSS	Regional Security System
R & D	Research and Development
SB	Special Branch
SDP	Strategic Defence Plan
SDR	Strategic Defence Review

Organisational Analysis-GDF

SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
TSA	Treaty on Security Assistance
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	South American Treaty on Defence
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
VAF	Venezuelan Armed Forces
WTO	World Trade Organisation




Illustration 1 – Map of Guyana showing GDF Sectors and CG Districts
(Courtesy of the Guyana Defence Force E-Library)

FOREWORD

The organisational analysis of the Guyana Defence Force was commissioned in March, 2008 as part of a four-stage plan to reengineer the Force. The other three critical outputs are the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), the Strategic Defence Plan (SDP) and the GDF Multi-year Development Plan (MYDP) which will be "role over" in concept. This analysis is aimed at generating an understanding of the current strengths and weaknesses of the organisation with a view to positioning the military to meet the short to long term strategic goals envisaged in response to the traditional, transnational and other threats to which the Guyana Defence Force must have the capability to respond to.

I expect a number of staff papers and documents to flow as a result of the findings of this analysis. These include a new proposed establishment which will be fine-tuned by the output from the SDR and SDP, a Career Development Plan (CDP) for Officers and Soldiers, a Force Training Doctrine (FTD) to meet the new thinking of the Force, a Force Personnel Policy (FPP) to represent new development in Human Resource Management and a Resource Acquisition Plan (RAP) generated from the obvious effects and impact of the shrinking capital flow over the years.

The analysis did identify major shortcomings, inclusive of the absence of a National Security Policy (NSP) to drive strategic defence concepts, human resource limitations and deficiencies in technology, air and maritime assets.

The analysis also identified the lack of growth in the Force which resulted from budgetary constraints and a shrinking capital environment as it relates to the GDF. It clearly shows the net result of no real increase in budgetary allocations on both sides - Capital and Current - and recognises current efforts to correct this imbalance.

The recommendations speak of a number of initiatives, based on the intermediate and strategic goals of the Force and emphasise the need for a SDR of the Force. However, in the short term, I do see the development and maintenance of good civil-military relations and the professional upgrade of all members of the Force as key ongoing activities to maintain balance and efficiency.

As Chief of Staff, and a part of this process, I am pleased at the output of this most important undertaking.



.....
G A R Best, MSM
Commodore, Chief of Staff
Defence Headquarters
2009-02-25

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This organisational analysis of the Guyana Defence Force was conducted over a twelve (12) month period during 2007/2008. The analysis offered a chance to understand the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats confronting the Force.

During the exercise, a review of the conditions, both external and internal to the Force, its operations, training and administrative functioning was done. It provides a better understanding of the indicators that pose a potential or actual threat to the Force and the indicators that point to the Force's strengths and weaknesses.

The team comprised Commodore GAR Best, MSM Chief of Staff, Colonel AT Pompey, MSM, Colonel J B Lovell, Colonel M Phillips, Lieutenant Colonel E Gaskin, Lieutenant Colonel C Baird, Commander J Flores, Lieutenant Colonel K Persaud and Lieutenant Colonel Walter Morris who contributed their time and expertise to the production of this organisational analysis.

Lieutenant Colonel S C James and Major O S Khan edited the analysis.

Finally, this analysis would enable Commanders to capitalise on the opportunities to minimise the effects of the internal and external threats and challenges to the Force.

ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE GDF

INTRODUCTION

This analysis of the Guyana Defence Force was conducted using the elements of organisational analysis (external/internal and operational environment). The programmes, outputs and results of this analysis are expected to meet the expected short term and strategic goals of the Guyana Defence Force.

Guyana gained independence on 26th May 1966, though the Guyana Defence Force was earlier established on 1st November 1965. It occupies a land area of 214,970 square kilometers and a maritime area of 54,000 square kilometers. Guyana's principal neighbours, Brazil, Venezuela and Suriname gained their independence in 1822, 1821 and 1975 respectively. The Guyana Defence Force was initially organised and philosophised to meet the national security interests of the United Kingdom. It was essentially Georgetown based. It is also apposite to note that the United Kingdom and Venezuela settled their Western border under the Treaty of Washington which resulted in the 1899 Award of the Tribunal as a full, perfect and final settlement of the boundaries. In 1905 the boundaries were surveyed and maps were issued. Despite this award, Venezuela was to repudiate this settlement in 1962 by reference to a posthumous objection to the award by one of the jurists¹. It must be noted that there is no boundary dispute between Guyana and Venezuela. This boundary is well settled.

On the other hand, the United Kingdom and Brazil on 6th November 1901, under the Treaty of London settled the British Guiana - Brazil land border which continues to be accepted by Guyana and Brazil.²

The boundaries between the Netherlands and British Guiana were settled between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1936 when, with the inclusion of Brazil, a tripartite junction was fixed delineating the single point where the three territories touched each other which is at the head of the Kutari River. Consequently, maps were issued to that effect.³ Notwithstanding the fixing of this tripartite junction, the Netherlands were to renounce this agreement and claim the New River as the source of the Corentyne and therefore all lands east of the New River belonged to Suriname. Suriname still maintains that claim.

Venezuela was to continue and claim all the waters adjoining and bordering their claimed area which extends the length of the distance of our Exclusive Economic Zone. No sooner than Guyana became independent these claims became ripe and the necessity to modernize and redeploy our forces to meet this new and emerging threat was quiet evident. But, it was the Venezuelan sponsored and assisted failed Rupununi uprising in January 1969 and the Surinamese failed attempt to seize lands east of New River which clearly demonstrated that the Defence Force needed to redeploy and adopt defence policies that reflect Guyana's national security interests.


1 David A. Granger, National Defence- A Brief History of the Guyana Defence Force (free press 2005) p 11.

2 Ibid, p 12.

3 Ibid, p 14

Organisational Analysis-GDF

The Force could no longer be a Georgetown based Army. The distances along our four borders are shown below:



*Illustration 2 - Guyana Map showing distances along its four borders
(Courtesy of the Guyana Defence Force E-Library)*

The Force was compelled to rethink, build with relevance and train for role. As a consequence, the Guyana Defence Force acquired air, land and maritime assets to meet the challenges of national defence and security. Alliances were forged with nations friendly with our then socialist ideology which enabled rapid expansion in the area of artillery and light infantry.

The geopolitics of the era was obvious. Guyana was not to become another Cuba by any means necessary and the strategic interests of the United States had to be protected. This is the geostrategic environment in which the Guyana Defence Force developed and to which there are still legacies and relevance to this day. The world has now changed! The cold war is over and the super powers have given way to one supra power, although, there is evidence of the resurgent old powers. Today the threats are different and non-traditional. They provide new challenges for the military, especially the Guyana Defence Force, which operates in a 'resource constraint' environment. Nevertheless, the Force helped shape the national defence doctrine of the nation, influenced our defence posture and, more recently, concentrated greater

resources at enhancing civil- military relations.

It is against this backdrop that the Force is being analysed, that is, - its critical constituents - in order to determine its 'now outputs' so we can together shape its future.

Objective To determine whether the Guyana Defence Force, as organised, is capable of satisfying its mandate of defending and maintaining order in Guyana

Vision Statement *The development of a modern Armed Force with specialised and distinct branches of service to include Army, Air and Naval units with a Chairman and Staff who would coordinate these Armed Forces under the general direction of a Defence Minister having regard to the necessity for Parliamentary scrutiny and oversight of military budgets and expenditure effectively reducing political partisanship and perceptions of interference.*

Constitutional Mandate Article 197 A (1) of the Constitution of Guyana provides that:

- “The State’s defence and security policy shall be to defend national independence, preserve the country’s sovereignty and integrity, and guarantee the normal functioning of institutions and the security of citizens against any armed aggression.
- The Defence and Security Forces shall be subordinate to the national and defence and security policy and owe allegiance to the constitution and to the Nation. The oath taken by members of the Defence and Security Forces shall establish their duty to respect the Constitution.
- The Guyana Defence Force established under the Defence Act shall in the discharge of its constitutional responsibilities function in such a manner as to earn the respect and enjoy the confidence of citizens.

Legal Status

The Defence Act Chapter 15:01 (Laws of Guyana), 1977, provides for the establishment of the GDF, its legal responsibilities and terms of service and employment of members. It also determines operational and ministerial responsibilities for the employment of the Force inside and outside of Guyana. Specifically the section provides for “*An act to provide for Defence and the maintenance of order by the establishment of a Defence Force and to provide for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto.*”⁴

The Defence (Amendment) Act 1990

This act sometimes referred to as the Coast Guard Act, provides for the Guyana Coast Guard to be created out of the existing Maritime assets of the Guyana Defence Force for the enforcement of laws applicable to the Territorial Sea and Exclusive

⁴ Government of Guyana, “The laws of Guyana, ch 15:01 Defence,” 1977, p11.

Organisational Analysis-GDF

Economic Zone (EEZ). This means that there is already legislative authority for the establishment of a Coast Guard Service in Guyana.

Legislative Mandate Section (5) of the Defence Act Chapter 15:01 charges the Defence Force with the defence of and maintenance of order in Guyana.

Mission From the Defence Act evolved the role of the GDF. This is three fold:

- To maintain the territorial integrity of Guyana and define aggression.
- To assist the civil power in the maintenance of law and order.
- To contribute to the economic development of the country.

Immediate Goals The immediate (short-term) goals will include the following:

- Restoring organisational morale, rebuilding public trust and earning the respect and confidence of our citizenry and the civil administration.
- Depoliticising the army and nurturing a culture of apolitical professionalism with loyalty to the Constitution of Guyana and the government of the day.
- Review of national defence priorities relating to the integrity of our national borders and sea space.
- Development of the Military Criminal Intelligence Department (MCID) as a national security/intelligence/agency to provide criminal intelligence to support joint operations with the police and other law enforcement agencies.
- Development of the G5 and G 6 staff branches to expand military output.
- Develop and maintain a posture that affords adequate responses to civil disasters and youth development.
- Establish a positive command climate as the basis for reversal of negative trends and cultivating a new culture of openness, harmonious relations with government, civil society and the professional discharge of the organisation's missions.
- Revisit and establish formal manual/guidelines for the Joint Services concept and reaffirm support for and improve mechanisms of Joint Services cooperation in all areas with particular emphasis on internal stabilisation and security among coastal communities.
- Support for regional, hemispheric and international security initiatives.
- Development of the Research and Development (R & D) branch to provide for expert evaluation and corresponding quality purchases.
- Establish an Inspectorate Department to police, monitor and provide feedback on task executions of operational and logistic command, and organisational development.

Strategic Goals

These include

- The development of a military capability superior to at least one of our neighbouring countries.
- Acquisition of naval platforms for force projection and enforcement of national laws in the territorial sea and EEZ.

- Development of a reliable defence and security capability to provide for surveillance, detection and interdiction operations.
- Development of significant offensive capability (Air, Naval, Army) to deter aggression.
- Development of a highly skilled and educated Officer and Other Ranks Corps.
- Development of a highly skilled and motivated Reserve Force to support the Regular Force.
- Development of a Regular and Reserve Force that earns the respect of the people.
- Development of strategic and statecraft partnerships with state, non state and foreign military in order to exponentially enhance human and material development.
- Defend national independence, preserve sovereignty, and intensify and guarantee the normal functioning of installations and the security of the nation against any armed aggression.
- Defend the country's democratic system of governance.

PART I

EXTERNAL

INTERNATIONAL

The external environment impacts the Force's ability to achieve its immediate and strategic goals. The key external imperatives are discussed and analysed for impact on the immediate and strategic goals, but more importantly, for impact on the ability of the Force to defend and maintain order in Guyana.

Our immediate international environment comprises the three nations - Brazil, Venezuela and Suriname. There are already dramatic changes between Guyana and Brazil, to wit, the construction of a bridge across the border Takatu River of our two countries. No doubt the economic and commercial traffic and security challenges - especially transborder crimes – in this area will pose great challenges for both sides as Brazil continues to seek a shorter route to the Atlantic as part of its national economic and security vision. Expansion is inevitable with such a large and poor population.

Venezuela is dramatic in the sense that its government has now fully embraced socialism as its national philosophy. To this end, Venezuela continues to use its oil wealth to leverage its own influence in this region and to influence Guyana's position in its favour if allowed to. There has been no unequivocal renunciation of its unjust claims to our Essequibo region and its continental influence is growing.

Guyana has recently and successfully, under the auspices of the United Nations, settled its international maritime boundary with Suriname and this now leaves only the Corentyne to be finalised as far as Suriname is concerned. To us the borders are

settled! More than likely Suriname may view this as another defeat which will influence the manner in which diplomatic and other relations are fashioned and discharged.

The South American continent, as a whole and in the context of an eco-political and military construct, has now become even more significant to Guyana. We are now signatories to the South American Treaty on Defence (UNASUR-Union of South American Nations) which is expected to emerge and grow into a NATO like military alliance. And there is talk about one South American Trade and Economic Organisation which will absorb the now existing ones and develop into an EU type trading block.

The leading South American nations all have significant military industrial complexes. They can certainly meet our short to medium term needs. Language differences, cultural differences, poverty, history, class stratification and the sheer economic imbalance are formidable challenges that Guyana faces and will continue to face as it explores its continental destiny.

For there is also considerable competition for our attention and resources from CARICOM, our sister economic trading block partner. This region provides greater comfort for Guyana in terms of language, history, culture, politics and support to our national security effort. The Caribbean region is a low economic output region and unable to leverage effectively. It depends significantly on various types of big brother assistance in the form of economic partnerships, food and financial aid and other forms of donor assistance. Not all of this assistance is processed in the region as a region. In fact most of it is channeled bilaterally which creates other issues that impact the security collective of the region.

The Caribbean region is a low economic output region and unable to leverage effectively. It depends significantly on various types of big brother assistance in the form of economic partnerships, food and financial aid and other forms of donor assistance. Not all of this assistance is processed in the region as a region. In fact, most of it is channeled bilaterally which creates other issues that impact the security collective of the region.

The global influence is no less significant. The security environment is very unstable. Terrorism has become a standard part of our daily lives in hot spots such as Iraq, Pakistan and more recently, India. But the threat of it returning to the United States, or affiliates, in particular, has resulted in such significant changes that international travel is no longer a fancy of persons any longer. The rich nations seem to be getting richer and the International Organisations are no closer to leveling the economic playing field between the developed, developing and more developed countries. The current failed World Trade Organisation (WTO) talks are quite fresh and evident. Rising oil and food prices are bound to continue as the main reason for new conflicts and increase in criminal acts. The financial meltdown we now witness is testimony of the ills and greed of modern economic entrepreneurship. These are the crucibles of the external international environment that are likely to shape the analysis of the Guyana

Defence Force.

NATIONAL

National Values And Interests: National values are the legal, philosophical and moral basis for continuation of the nationhood of Guyana. They are the core of our national interests. National interests are derived from our national values and are Guyana's perceived needs and aspirations largely in relation to our external environment.

Guyana's national values, broadly speaking, include:

- A system of governance that promotes broad based participation in national decision making.
- Development of a harmonious community based on democratic values, social justice, fundamental human rights and the rule of law.
- A nation that is indivisible, secular, democratic, and sovereign.
- Promoting and forging worldwide comity.

Guyana's national interests, on the other hand, include:

- Inviolability of our frontier and territorial integrity.
- Peaceful settlement of disputes with other states
- The non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.
- Forging cooperation among other states.
- The protection of the rights and interest of citizens resident abroad.
- Support for human rights and fundamental freedoms in other states.
- Uphold the tenets of good governance.
- Rapid economic development and poverty alleviation.
- Realisation of a cohesive multi racial society where decision making involves every sector.

ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL VALUES AND INTERESTS

The national values and interests of Guyana are derived from our constitution, international conventions and international best practice. The Guyana Defence Force has a quality Officer Corps educated at the graduate and undergraduate levels capable of interpreting and understanding national values and interests. A greater challenge to understanding these same interests and values are expected from our other ranks who are less educated. Education must now expand to include legal and human rights and greater emphasis must be placed on academic education at the other rank level. The goal is to provide education at all levels for all levels. There should be no doubt in our minds that the more educated the Force the easier it would be to take ownership of national values and interests. In this context leadership, at the Officer and Non Commissioned Officer levels, is critical so that the entire Force embraces these national interests and value systems.

The promotion of these national interests and values falls primarily on the shoulders of the Government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is crucial to the peaceful resolution of border infractions and is the vanguard to military diplomacy. It is a critical instrument of national power and the lead agency in defence diplomacy at the strategic level. Balanced decisions and consensus building at the national level are essential ingredients to be practiced day to day to achieve success. There should be a total collaborative and integrated approach to the promotion of national values and interests. In this regard, the Guyana Defence Force must be allowed to forge strategic and statecraft partnerships with state and non state actors in order to support this critical external imperative factor.

The goal is to provide education at all levels for all levels. There should be no doubt in our minds that the more educated the Force the easier it would be to take ownership of national values and interests.

No doubt defence diplomacy must be part of our strategic outlook. There must be greater interaction between the Defence Board, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Guyana Defence Force on a regular basis. Each entity must invite the other to participate and brief on defence and diplomacy matters. It is this conversion of activities that will enable the state to positively leverage the ever changing international and national environment.

NATIONAL THREATS.

Our national interests allow us to define the threats. The importance of our national security interests is the determinant that will prioritise our national threats. Based on the national interests outlined the threats to Guyana are deduced as follows:

- Threats to our territoriality and sovereignty due to unjustified maritime and land border claims of land and sea space legally in our possession by Venezuela and unjustified land claim of land legally in our possession by Suriname.
- Political and social instability due to differences between major ethnic groups and political parties.
- Transnational crime due to porous borders and increased narco-transiting in Guyana.
- Degradation of the environment due to legal and illegal mining and forestry activities.
- Natural disaster, especially flooding due to changing climatic conditions, global warming and an antiquated water management system.
- High unemployment and poverty.
- Poaching and over exploitation of marine resources.
- Reduced law enforcement capabilities.
- Inadequate public health capacity to counter endemic diseases and other social issues.
- Food security.



Illustration 3 - Map showing illegal trafficking routes into Guyana (Courtesy of the Guyana Defence Force E-Library)



Illustration 4 - Map showing principal drug routes. (Courtesy of the Guyana Defence Force E-Library)

ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL THREATS

The national threats to the nation affect every facet of society. It therefore requires a response from state and non state actors. At the level of government the forging of regional alliances to counter sovereignty issues must be a signal feature of the diplomatic effort. The Force, on the other hand, must continue to develop a more

The cost of meeting these threats must be proportionate to national budgetary totals but there must be a clear understanding and appreciation by Government that International Financial strictures on defence and security spending are likely to contribute to greater threats to the nation.

capable military in order to define aggression and maintain security. The cost of meeting these threats must be proportionate to national budgetary totals but there must be a clear understanding and appreciation by Government that International Financial strictures on defence and security spending are likely to contribute to greater threats to the nation. A more transparent governance system and greater involvement of various ethnic groups and ethnic minorities in the decision making process would undoubtedly serve to combat fears and accusation of ethnic marginalisation. Greater ethnic security and ethnic involvement in the national development thrust will provide a

broader ethnic base for recruitment and balance in the Guyana Defence Force.

Despite unjustified claims to our territory by two of Guyana's neighbours, bilateral cooperation with those countries are essential to combat trans border crimes. The Guyana Defence Force and the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs must establish respective protocols to promote border cooperation. The Force, in keeping with its role, must train to contribute to the development of enhanced enforcement capacity of the civil powers to combat environmental irregularities and civil disasters. These robust responsibilities will certainly tax the human resource capacity of the Force, but the Force could use its reserves to satisfy these non military threats to the nation.

Our defence outlook must be total. Total national defence means that every sector must participate and take ownership of the defence of Guyana. Illegal mining in our border communities would naturally promote conflict on our borders - a situation we must always avoid - but our presence on our borders must be a priority so as to forge development and create human posture over our land. In similar vein, rising sea levels due to climate change would force population shifts and tax the already restricted spending on defence. Therefore, an integrated but early response to the anticipated problems due to this phenomenon must be defined now and acted on speedily. The defence sector is never immune from the vagaries of society. In fact the defence sector suffers equally, if not more, from the vagaries of society.

No doubt, our entire security posture must now come under review. A Strategic Defence Review (SDR) is critical to an understanding of the significant security challenges. Finally, the findings of this review would point the way for a new Strategic Defence Plan (SDP) for the nation.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVES

The Guyana Defence Force, recognising the dynamics of the international geo-political environment, has forged several bilateral relationships with friendly nations in the interest of defence and security of the nation. This initiative has caused us to be seen as a friendly nation to countries in the Caribbean, South America, North America and Europe. It is also through these bilaterals that the Force is able to leverage advanced defence and security training and acquisition of non lethal defence materiel. It is an interactive process. Some of our international partners use our training bases and troops for joint training which provides another platform for the enhancement of defence skills and the promotion of friendly relations in a positive environment. We now look at these international security initiatives.

The United States The Guyana Defence Force has an established security cooperation agreement with the United States. It is driven by the United States Military Liaison Officer based at the United States Embassy in Georgetown and the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Guyana Defence Force under a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and other diplomatic instruments issued from time to time. These bilateral cooperation agreements include:

- **VIP Visits/Staff Talks** VIP visits are high level activities by Department of Defence and civilian policy makers to Guyana as well as GDF and government officials visiting the USA. Staff visits are generally meetings to discuss military to military cooperation. VIP visits and Staff Talks are normally used to coordinate military to military interaction (operations and exercises) and to discuss policy issues.
- **International Military Education and Training (IMET)** Under this programme grant money is provided to the Guyana Defence Force and the Guyana Government for training and education of our military and sometimes our civilian personnel. There is a sub programme called the Enhanced IMET (E-IMET) that focuses on the education of civilian and military leaders in the areas of civil military relations, human rights, defence resource management and military justice.
- **Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programme (HCA)** These projects are designed to provide assistance to host nation populace in conjunction with a military exercise by deployed US forces. United States forces would have been involved in Guyana for projects such as: well drilling as well as medical, dental, and veterinary care.
- **Foreign Military Sales (FMS)** This programme manages government to government purchases of weapons and other defence articles, defence services, and military training. It allows foreign governments to use the US government as an intermediary to purchase items. It is doubtful that the GDF would have benefited from this since to access the programme we would have had to use our own monies. An associated programme is the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) where a country could go right to the manufacturer without reference to the US government.
- **Foreign Military Financing (FMF)** This is a grant financing programme where the United States provides grants to key allies to acquire United States military

articles, services and training. The benefiting country does not have to repay the monies. The GDF has benefited from this programme. But it has produced mixed results e.g. US conventional tactics vary to our traditional British military concepts – standardisation was inevitable.

- Exchange Programmes Under this programme exchanges are done at the individual, or at the section through to battalion sized organisations. It seeks to foster mutual understanding of the visited Force's organisation, administration and operations. The GDF is yet to benefit directly from this programme. It is primarily one- sided.
- Information and Data Exchanges This involves the provision of open source information resources, primarily imaging and geospatial products, which can be used for security as well as developmental and disaster related purposes. In the past the GDF has received marine safety information. In the near future the Force anticipates information relating to other security imperatives. The level of sharing is disappointing. The request by the United States is made at the highest governmental level but our request for information is not equally treated at the equivalent United States Government level
- Regional Strategic Studies Centres There are five of these Centres and the GDF and Guyanese personnel benefit from studies at the Centre for Hemispheric Defence Studies (CHDS). A major thrust of training courses at CHDS is to advance the civil military values of a democratic society.
- Ratification of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court Even though Guyana, and several other states, ratified this Statute so that the ICC could come into being, an agreement was made with the United States to grant immunity to its military personnel so that they could not be prosecuted for war crimes or crimes against humanity, the so called "Article 98."
- Maritime Anti Narcotics Bill Guyana in 2003 promulgated this Bill, commonly called the "Shiprider Bill," which provides for maritime law enforcement interdiction in Guyana's territorial and other waters using United States vessels and aircraft and personnel from the United States and Guyana military. There has been no actual testing of this agreement and no Guyanese ship rider has been requested.
- Annual Trade Winds Exercise The Guyana Defence Force participates in this United States sponsored annual United States and Allied Caribbean Nations exercise aimed at responding to security and disaster crises. This exercise rotates through various Caribbean nations. It was held in Guyana on one occasion.
- Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) There exists a SOFA that proscribes the attendant rights, privileges and responsibilities of United States servicemen deployed in Guyana. There are no reciprocal rights.

ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVES

United States There is no doubt that these programmes under the security cooperation with the United States provide direct assistance to the Guyana Defence Force. However, these benefits must be placed in context in order to determine their real value to the Force. The military and security literature provided to the Force and Guyanese civilians reflect the values and interest systems of the United States. Indeed, the direct benefits do not, in all circumstances, reflect and protect our national interests and values. Even though Guyana ratified the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, the continuation of the security cooperation with the United States was only guaranteed after Guyana agreed to grant immunity to United States military personnel so that they could not be prosecuted for possible war crimes or crimes against humanity in Guyana, the so called "Article 98." And this holds well for the other areas of cooperation, in particular, the Maritime Cooperation Agreement also known as the 'Ship Rider' and the Status of Forces Agreement which, in essence, reflects one sided benefits to rights, privileges and responsibilities for servicemen of the United States. The Force benefits from these initiatives only through careful selection of programmes and adoption of relevant strategies at the output application levels.

The training provided, without more, sets the stage for military to military integration and limited interoperability as allied nations in the realm of defence and security within Guyana and beyond. In this regard, the Annual Trade Winds exercise provides an excellent platform for force integration to meet common threats. These threats must now be reclassified and be consistent with the directions of the CARICOM Heads -in the context of security as the fourth pillar of CARICOM- and the strategies and tactics used within the Trade Winds concept must now change to meet these new threats to the Region. We must also recognise that our weapons systems are not the same. Ours is primarily Warsaw Pact in origin while the United States is NATO in origin. This difference disfavours force support and results in reduced interoperability. Notwithstanding, the combat multiplier is significantly low as greater resource allocation is required to give the Force a necessary strategic parity, though it is conceded that the fight against transborder crimes and terrorism require collaborative efforts with allied nations and in this context the security cooperation with the United States provides benefits to Guyana and the Guyana Defence Force.

The United Kingdom There exists a formal Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the UK and the GDF. It proscribes the attendant rights, privileges and responsibilities of United Kingdom servicemen deployed in Guyana. There are no reciprocal rights. Beyond this agreement the Guyana Defence Force benefits from training, though on a limited scale, from the United Kingdom. More recently, however, the United Kingdom seems to prefer to conduct exercises for its troops in Guyana on a relatively large scale. Clearly the opportunities for training in the United Kingdom are limited and, of necessity, the '*train the trainer to train*' and mobile training initiatives are particular combat multipliers that must be pursued. Though we conduct most of our military training within the Guyana Defence Force, continued liaison with the United Kingdom military will be a positive multiplier since our fundamental defence strategy

and tactics emerged from United Kingdom Doctrine. More recently, the UK has taken the lead in providing funding to the Guyana Government for a comprehensive security sector reform – but again there are difficulties in identifying a true partnership and ownership by the Guyanese people of this initiative. There has to be a definite conclusion on the partnership approach to security reform in Guyana.

China, Canada and India The GDF currently benefits from a security cooperation agreement with China. Specifically, there is a Line of Credit with the **Chinese Military** to the tune of five hundred thousand United States dollars (US\$500,000) that enables that country to supply us with non lethal military materiel. The line of credit is renewed by agreement and to date it approximates to every two years. The agreement with China also allows for military training of Officers and ranks at Chinese Military Schools. This training is now a combat multiplier at the staff and operational levels and soon to be a multiplier at the technical level. There are significant benefits for continued bilateral cooperation agreements with the Chinese Military as that country is clearly a major player on the international stage.

The Government of Guyana is also engaging China on numerous projects which include the completed construction of the International Convention Centre and significant investments in the mining sector not to mention construction of ferries for our waterways. To this end, the Guyana Defence Force anticipates the provision of specialised military, air and naval training as the security cooperation agreement with the Chinese Military matures over the years. There is no formal security or defence agreement with the **Canadian Military**, however, the Canadian Military has recently returned to offering military staff training to the Guyana Defence Force. This is a welcome return. The Canadian Staff Schools are very competitive and the learning in Canada is easily de-rated to suit the Guyana Defence Force. The Force must continue to forge even stronger relationships with the Canadian military to include the provision of specialised military, air and Coast Guard training.

There is no formal security or defence cooperation agreement with the **Indian Military**, however, the Guyana Defence Force has benefited from military training from the Indian Military, particularly in Staff. This is a very developed military force from which the Guyana Defence Force can benefit. The military industrial complex in India is growing and their products are of a higher quality, tropicalised and suited for Guyana. Even though the world is like one village the distance between Guyana and India and proprietary considerations will impact on the type of defence products to be considered. No doubt a line of credit facility would be most effective.

ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVES

Guyana continues to enjoy cordial and diplomatic relationships with a number of countries including its three neighbours; Suriname in the East, Brazil in the South West and Venezuela in the West. Of the three, Brazil is considered the stabilising mediator in land disputes and claims to Guyana's territory primarily through the acceptance of its international boundary with Guyana.

Brazil The Guyana Defence Force has a Defence Cooperation Agreement with the Brazil Military. There are three elements of this agreement that are currently emphasized: namely **Training, Regional Military and Intelligence Exchange and Bilateral Conference of Heads of Armed Forces**. The Guyana Defence Force enjoys military staff and specialist training and, to some extent, naval training with Brazil. The reduced opportunities in naval training have been a force divider for the Force and continue to be a critical area for re-engagement within the context of the defence cooperation between the Guyana Defence Force and the Brazilian Military. The Regional Military and Intelligence Exchange brings together the Commanding Officers of the border forces once annually in each country for discussions on information and intelligence sharing and joint activities to strengthen border security and defence. The Bilateral Conference of Heads of Armies is held biennially in Brasilia between the Chief of Staff of the Guyana Defence Force and the Head of the Brazilian Armed Forces. It focuses on policy issues of mutual interest to both militaries. These initiatives between the two forces, though only part of the broad articles of defence cooperation, provide an excellent platform for amicable border relations.

Defence Cooperation with the Brazilian Military must operate as a multiplier and narrow the defence gaps that exist along the 1800 Kilometers border between our two countries. The Government of Guyana, now a signatory to UNASUR, a South American Defence organisation, must leverage this body in order to create a stable environment especially along our borders.

The Guyana Defence must seek to expand the actual joint border activities geared at improving defence and security. Defence Cooperation with the Brazilian Military must operate as a multiplier and narrow the defence gaps that exist along the 1800 Kilometers border between our two countries. The Government of Guyana, now a signatory to UNASUR, a South American Defence organisation, must leverage this body in order to create a stable environment especially along our borders.

Venezuela and Suriname There exists no military initiative between the Venezuelan Armed Forces and the Guyana Defence Force. However, the GDF has, in the past,

benefited from training opportunities with the **Venezuelan Armed Forces**. More recently, the Commander of the Venezuelan Armed Forces extended an invitation to the Guyana Defence Force to visit officially to discuss defence and security cooperation. This is a positive sign and the visit has been approved. Even though Venezuela maintains an active, but unjustified, territorial claim against Guyana, an energetic border cooperation agreement with Venezuela is critical to combating transborder crimes, in particular, trafficking in narcotics and weapons. The Guyana Defence Force enjoys no defence or security cooperation with Suriname. Like Venezuela, Suriname maintains an active, but unjustified, territorial claim against Guyana and it is also crucial that our two forces cooperate to effectively combat transborder crimes. The Government of Guyana should leverage other continental and non continental neighbours to assist it in establishing security and defence cooperation agreements with Venezuela and Suriname.

France There exists an ongoing bilateral training exchange between the Guyana Defence Force and the **French Armed Forces** based in French Guiana. Troops from both Forces undergo joint jungle training in their respective countries. This defence cooperation is facilitated through a protocol between France and Guyana that speaks to training between our two countries.

ANGLOPHONE CARIBBEAN SECURITY INITIATIVES

There are several security initiatives in the Anglophone Caribbean that impact the Guyana Defence Force. In July 2006 Guyana signed the **Treaty on Security Assistance (TSA) Among CARICOM Member States** which provides for:

- The efficient and timely response to and management of natural and man-made disasters.
- The expeditious, efficient mobilisation and deployment of regional resources in order to manage and defuse national and regional crises and to combat serious crimes.
- The combating and eliminating of threats to national and regional security.
- The preservation of the territorial integrity of contracting States.

This therefore enjoins the GDF to deploy men and matériel in pursuance of the aims and objectives of the Treaty as well as, if necessary, receive CARICOM men and matériel in Guyana.

In order to provide an effective lead mechanism for the regional security effort, a **Protocol to the TSA** was established which created the CARICOM Operations Planning and Coordinating Staff (COPACS). COPACS will be established as deemed necessary by the CARICOM Heads to execute the aims and objectives of the TSA. COPACS will therefore be required to mobilise under a single command to manage incidents or events. The GDF is duty bound to provide resources once COPACS is established.

There is also the **Regional Security System (RSS)**. This initiative initially catered for the mobilisation of security forces in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to respond to member countries needs. It is a treaty organisation. The parameters were later widened to include Guyana and other non OECS nations within CARICOM as associates and not treaty members. The annual EXERCISE TRADEWINDS, involving member countries and sponsored by the UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND (USSOUTHCOM), with British Forces support, provides training in specific security tasks. The opportunity is also provided for the creation of interoperable networks among regional forces. The RSS continues to provide the infrastructure to mobilise within the OECS and forces within the wider region to combat disaster and security crises.

Maritime Cooperation and Airspace Agreement This treaty provides for CARICOM forces to operate in each other territories in the fight against crime, terrorism and other security challenges. It is in effect a CARICOM “Ship and Air Rider” Agreement.

Regional Training Opportunities The GDF benefits from training opportunities in the following CARICOM countries: Barbados, Belize, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Additionally, there have been instances when extra regional institutions and countries have conducted courses in other CARICOM countries to which the GDF has subscribed.

ANALYSIS OF ANGLOPHONE CARIBBEAN SECURITY INITIATIVES

Guyana has become increasingly vulnerable to the activities generated from transnational crimes, particularly, illegal trafficking in drugs and weapons, money laundering and illegal migration. The emergence of violent gangs and contract killings associated with the deportation of criminal aliens from metropolitan countries and the cross border narcotics and illegal arms trade have further resulted in significant negative impacts on the level of investment, retention of skilled manpower and the quality of life of the general population. This phenomenon affects the entire Anglophone Caribbean.

CARICOM forces must be able to fight crime across borders and in each other's territory. The CARICOM Arrest Warrant is one key initiative in this regard. In this context, the Guyana Defence Force will become more active within the CARICOM region as existing security elements are consolidated into a fully fledged Caribbean Security Cooperation System.

Regional Security must now be a key area of functional cooperation for Guyana and the Guyana Defence Force as we confront these challenges. The Regional Security mechanisms must now integrate into one seamless organisation and policy driven body to address the security concerns in the region. CARICOM forces must be able to fight crime across borders and in each other's territory. The CARICOM Arrest Warrant is one key initiative in this regard. In this context, the Guyana Defence Force will become more active within the CARICOM region as existing security elements are consolidated into a fully fledged Caribbean Security Cooperation System.

A Caribbean Security Cooperation System envisages regional or sub regional rapid response mechanisms to combat regional security threats arising out of natural disasters, terrorism, insurrection or invasion. In this vein, the Caribbean may well be divided into CARICOM Security Zones with Rapid Response Forces available to meet those threats- more so now, that CARICOM has adopted security as its fourth pillar. In the long term, the RSS may well morph into COPACS as the one Caribbean Security System. These new initiatives will require greater Guyana Defence Force human resources contribution at the G1-G6 staff levels and the command level including troop allocation. Correspondingly, the Guyana Defence Force will have to expand and increase its training output which may very well include greater numbers from CARICOM states. As a consequence, the Force may well suffer changes in its

structure and personnel organisation to reflect and meet these new initiatives. Members of the Guyana Defence Force will find themselves travelling and serving outside of Guyana for significant periods and the consequent social and welfare issues attendant in these circumstances must also be addressed.

Similar to benefits of the international security initiatives, the regional security initiatives also enhance the professionalism of the Force with exposure to training and operations. An important facet of these security initiatives is that the Guyana Defence Force engages in defence diplomacy when we offer training to regional forces and, at the same time, train and operate with regional forces. One must note also that new and emerging regional obligations of the Guyana Defence Force will impact on the role of the Force and demand possible legislative intervention.

NATIONAL

Sugar and Rice Industries Sugar and rice cultivation form part of the national psyche. The sugar industry employs over 25,000 persons directly and therefore provides a livelihood for at least 125,000 persons. Sugar generates 30% of Guyana's foreign exchange and saves millions in displacing expensive fuel by its use of bagasse waste for energy and a unique system of water transport of harvested canes. Community services and infrastructure in the country areas depend on sugar while the industry provides rural stability and keeps in check the increase in urban overcrowding with all its attendant problems.

Restructuring sugar management is on the move with the Skeldon Modernisation Plant coming on stream. This will reduce cost of production of a pound of sugar while increasing the industry's competitiveness. This estate will also house a power generation facility, a distillery and a bagasse plant. This modern sugar factory will produce high quality raw sugar tied to an increasingly attractive demand internationally. Bagasse will produce an average of 10 mega watts of electricity up to 77 gigawatt hours annually. Bagasse is expected to replace use of light and heavy fuel oil in diesel engine-driven generators powered by the Guyana Power and Light Company.

The rice industry represents a way of life for many of Guyana's people and has deep roots in the history of Guyana. Rice is the second largest agricultural sub-sector in Guyana, second only to sugar. Guyana's economy, and indeed stability, is heavily dependent on the health of its agricultural sector and, by extension, on the rice industry. Rice accounts for approximately 4% of the GDP of Guyana. Close to 70% of Guyana's rice is exported and represents approximately 11% of Guyana's foreign exchange.

This industry incorporates many stakeholders, farmers, millers, exporters, consumers, input suppliers, transport providers and the public sector as a whole. Production is carried out by private small scale farmers. Approximately 10,000 rice farm families depend directly on rice for their livelihood. In addition there are 105 privately owned rice mills in Guyana. Taken as a whole close to 100,000 persons rely on this vital industry.

ANALYSIS OF SUGAR AND RICE INDUSTRIES

These two industries affect the lives of close to 205,000 persons which is close to 33% of the population of Guyana and earns close to 41% of the country's foreign exchange. Its continued survival is therefore crucial to Guyana's economic fortunes which are directly related to security, especially food security for the people of Guyana. The Guyana Defence Force must be prepared to defend and protect these two industries. The Force, as an institution, must reorganize its combat elements to meet possible threats to the survival of these industries in the light of internal destabilization activities and rising food prices. This is a positive impact! Quick reaction forces should be ready to support the Police in the event of industrial unrest. On the other hand, the work force of these two industries consist primarily of East Indian Guyanese. This phenomenon makes it difficult for the Force to recruit young men from East Indian communities as East Indians make up a significant percentage of the general work force in the two industries. For the Guyana Defence Force this is a labour repressive environment. Too few East Indians are available for recruitment into the Force. An unlikely consequence is the inability of the Force to achieve ethnic balance in these circumstances.

OIL

Guyana is not a producer of oil. According to the CIA country report for 2005, Guyana's estimated daily consumption was 10,700 bbl/day. At current prices the country is spending US\$ 1,070,000 per day to sustain the economy. The reality is that the cost of living is directly linked to the vagaries of the price of oil. Anticipated increases will continue to create additional hardships on the vulnerable sections of society. The multinational companies currently holding petroleum exploration licenses may not provide a near term solution to our energy problems as current world output seems adequate. More than likely the owners of licenses may very well time the market for a strategic intervention taking into consideration the lead time to get oil production going. Notwithstanding the above, the Guyana Defence Force must plan on the likelihood of an oil find and therefore acquire the strategic assets to define maritime aggression and maintain maritime integrity. Sufficient lead time to acquire maritime assets and training must be a definite projection of the Force so as to enable the Coast Guard to display maritime force projection in defence of the nation's maritime environment. This should not be seen as a 'stand alone' tasking for the Force. Asset sharing at the national and regional

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levels should be encouraged. In this regard the Force may find it useful to establish a Coast Guard Reserve and a Coast Guard Auxiliary force to achieve the objective of maritime defence efficiency.

PART II

INTERNAL

TERRITORIAL DEFENCE AND SECURITY

There is need for government to articulate a national defence and national security strategy. The changing face of crime and new and significant threats to food security along with increase in oil and food prices indicate that the Government must now harmonize all of its resources to meet these threats. Every facet of life is affected. Guyana's borders are porous, airstrips, ports and rivers are not effectively monitored. In addition, national professional and social standards have fallen and, in this context, severe pressure is placed on the security forces in responding to youths turning to crime as a solution to the absence of multiple economic opportunities. It must be remembered that crime is a social problem that requires a social solution. The intervention of the Defence Force in support of the Police is measure only. Social intervention by the State is a necessary requirement. Defence in this context must, of necessity, have primacy in border deployment activities. But total defence and security of the nation requires a total effort. It requires both a military and non-military response. Our combined human and materiel resources must be integrated and reorganised to meet our defence requirements.

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ANALYSIS

The combined effect of the issues relevant to territorial defence and security indicate that the Force must respond in a manner that would provide both tactical and strategic responses towards improved defence and security. A review and continued updates to existing threat assessments relevant to Brazil, Venezuela and Suriname are

essential to maintain currency of the total status quo. The Force must review its existing posture, operations on the border and associated manpower and physical assets in order to determine its suitability to meet the current threats.

The Force must also develop strategies in association with other Law Enforcement agencies to combat the trafficking of drugs and guns entering the country through open borders. This will necessitate an expansion of operations on major rivers, waterways, territorial sea and EEZ to reduce illicit activities and maintain sovereignty.

A rapid response to high profile crimes is crucial to stability and confidence in the nation. The Force must continue its efforts to recover its missing weapons and at the same time heighten Joint Services cooperation and coordination. More specifically, the Force must review protocols and contingency plans to support the police and prison services in emergencies, assess the efficacy of existing coastal locations and bases and develop forward operating bases with Quick Reaction Forces to support police and suppress serious armed criminal activity. Additionally, the Force must use the Military Criminal Intelligence Department (MCID) to develop intelligence related to the recovery of missing AK 47 rifles and other Defence Force assets on a continuing basis. MCID will also complement the Police Special Branch/Criminal Investigation Department as a national intelligence and investigation body. These initiatives are to include the development of coordinated and joint strategy to combat and effectively eradicate crime on major rivers, piracy on our coastal waters and continued support for law enforcement activity related to smuggling of fuel and drugs and trafficking in persons.

The GDF must recommit to its pledge of a National Service beyond defence and security matters. It must develop capacity as a national search and rescue agency - both air and sea - and a competence to support and supplement the Civil Defence Commission in national emergencies. Other activities beyond defence and security matters include hearts and minds programmes in hinterland, coastal villages and urban communities. The Force must also sustain its efforts to reduce and arrest deviant and criminal acts by serving members against the civilian population and increase counter drugs operations. In order to effectively arrive at the key determinants to guide in these actions a review is required which must examine the operations, administration, logistics and training activities of the Guyana Defence Force.

ANALYSIS OF CURRENT CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

It is recognised that if the Defence Force is to grow and develop there must necessarily be a cordial and harmonious relationship with the civil administration. The Force must

We must commit to civilian oversight as provided for in the Defence Act, reduce loss and waste and improve accountability and transparency. The Force has, as a primary task, to engage the civilian administration to improve the quality of life for military members through better pay and conditions of service.

Our defence diplomacy must be clear and the Force should have early visibility into possible activities of government agencies and foreign militaries in order to offer early defence and security advice to secure the nation State.

therefore avoid an adversarial approach to civil-military relations. We must commit to civilian oversight as provided for in the Defence Act, reduce loss and waste and improve accountability and transparency. The Force has as a primary task to engage the civilian administration to improve the quality of life for military members through better pay and conditions of service. As regards conditions of service amendments to the Defence Act would be necessary. Over the years the Force has been placed under stringent controls as a result of the erstwhile

adversarial approach to civilian oversight. Correspondingly, authority for decision making in terms of training and employment was moved from the Chief of Staff to the Defence Board. A return of this authority once exercised by the Chief of Staff is a positive step in the rebuilding of civil military relations. More importantly, maintaining regular and continuous interaction between the Commander in Chief and senior leadership of the Force on a continuous basis will provide an enriched climate for the further development of positive relations. At the level of the administration, specific and regular hosting of Defence Board meetings with major input from the Defence Force in the development of the agenda will deepen and widen constructive civilian military relations. Partnerships with Ministries of the government and other state and non state actors are critical to a successive and enduring civil-military climate. Our defence diplomacy must be clear and the Force should have early visibility into possible activities of government agencies and foreign militaries in order to offer early defence and security advice to secure the nation State. There should be no doubt that a multi- lateral approach to defence security and diplomacy would negate the bilateral approach preferred by some foreign military. We must now promote state coordination and control. Government and quasi government agencies must involve the Force as a partner prior to and during deliberations with foreign military.

STANDARDS, RECAPITALISATION, EXPANSION, COMBAT MULTIPLIERS AND POLITICS

Regeneration of Professional Standards and Increasing Institutional Capacity:

Over the years professional standards and institutional capacity waned under a closed approach to defence management. If standards are to be developed and capacity maintained the Guyana Defence Force must be able to also draw on the institutional memory of senior retired Officers, skilled civilians and friends external to the Force. There is a professional cadre of trained

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Officers and Non Commissioned Officers who have benefited from foreign training under various military training assistance programmes. However, there is a need for greater transfer of skills to lower levels and development of the sub-units and units of the Force.

The Force must now establish a Research and Development Department which will conduct continuous doctrinal review and studies of lessons learnt from past exercises and operations. This department must also conduct testing and sampling of kit and equipment and advise on procurement. Over the longer term its capacity must include the ability to study and advise on evolving technologies. Regeneration of professional standards also includes determined improved physical infrastructure, staffing and training of front line units with the best personnel available. Other mechanisms will embrace the introduction of a reward based system for upward mobility and growth together with screening of new entrants and continuous vetting of ranks over their period of service.

Additional compliance mechanisms to provide for impartial inspection and reporting of units along with increased levels of competitiveness among units of the Force will certainly be positives in the context of regeneration of professional standards and increasing institutional capacity.

Improved personal services will be possible through the development of an effective military police company as a necessary instrument of the personnel services branch of the force and review of the scales of punishment and system of correction for deviant soldiers. The Force now has to consider effective measures to aid correction of Officers and soldiers. Introduction of counseling sessions for Officers and soldiers after completing a period of punishment must be high on the Force's agenda in order to measure the success of the discipline applied. Additional compliance mechanisms to provide for impartial inspections and reporting of units along with increased levels of competitiveness among units of the Force will certainly be positives in the context of regeneration of professional standards and increasing institutional capacity.

RECAPITALISATION

This is necessary to secure new kit and equipment to replace old, obsolete items. Our mobility in air, land and water transport require significant upgrades and changes in some instances. The Force requires weapon upgrades, additions and upgrades for field artillery. Re-stocking of front line and training munitions consistent with weapon systems and replacement of ammunition (field artillery) destroyed during the explosion at Camp Groomes must be of a priority high and a permanent feature in the Force's strategic defence review. Acquisition of secure and reliable communication equipment and the integration of combat net radio and computer systems to improve command and control is also critical to provide the interoperability for integrated and transition operations. This is particularly relevant now, in the context of small team operations

on the coast in support of law enforcement. The infrastructure of the Force requires repairs, maintenance and re-designing of some existing structures. Undertaking of capital works to cater for force expansion is also a feature of recapitalisation now in demand by the Force.

REORGANISATION AND EXPANSION

This is essential to maximise on available human resources. At the same time the expanded role of the Force in supporting national security and law enforcement on the coast and securing of our waterways will necessitate an enlargement of the Force's establishment. Increase in the "teeth to tail" ratios of the Force is inevitable and a clear mandate to minimize civilian employment and significantly reduce recruitment of women and re-enlistment of retirees are essential to Force operational expansion. In terms of numbers, it is now more than necessary to increase the strength and capability of the Coast Guard and bring existing combat arms, combat support and combat service support units up to their approved strengths. And, on the broader level, establish a second regular infantry battalion to provide for coastal deployment and more effective rotation of troops to tasks.

INCREASED EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT MULTIPLIERS

These are technologies that are advantageous to organisations such as the GDF with human resource limitations. These technologies can greatly increase efficiency and bring about outcomes that far outweigh the human and material investment. Technological exposure and application of remote sensing to provide benefits to surveillance and detection, improving long range artillery effectiveness and upgrading combat engineering capability must now represent a new thrust of the Force. Neither is it necessary for the Force to acquire and keep these skills and technical expertise. Rather, the Force must be able to leverage these skills and technology and develop a protocol for out sourcing some of our requirements for skills and technology. Validation of our training by external academic and technical institutions would also act as a combat multiplier. The Force must ensure that its skill and technology levels include: computer programming, software design and development, surveying, train the trainer to train, course design and courseware development, refrigeration and mechanical engineering, civil and marine engineering, quantity surveying and project development and execution.

POLITICS

The pursuit of 'Cheap' organisational politics has, at times, led to favouritism, adversely affecting the impartial and impersonal approach to activities such as postings, promotions, appointments and selection for courses. The creation of 'political alliances' have served to reduce cohesion and damage esprit de corps. These alliances have sometimes proven strong enough to challenge formal lines of authority. The Guyana

Defence Force is apolitical and must remain that way. The informal political structures can be significantly reduced through redrafting of guidelines and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), strict compliance with SOPs, and development of personnel management systems that are based on merit and performance standards.

HUMAN RESOURCES

Characteristics The Force's composition reflects military Officers with compulsory ages of retirement of 45-55 years and Other Ranks with retirement ages of 40-45 years. Generally recruited at ages 18-25, military members are contracted to serve for an initial period of not less than 3 years but there is an expectation of military service for a period of 20 years. Military personnel are also eligible for retirement benefits if they so choose after a period of 20 years service. Membership of the Force reflects ethnic imbalance with 85% of its members being of African ancestry. However, it must be noted that service within the GDF is voluntary and the eligibility standards and selection processes are subject to public scrutiny. At present the female component of the force reflects 10.92% of the strength. This number must be considered too high when Force policy precludes the placement of women in Combat Arms (front line fighting units). The civilian component reflects 13.08%.

The policy in the past allowed for the recruitment of civilians to fill posts in key areas such as finance and budgeting because of a paucity of such skills within the force. This situation was meant to be corrected over the medium to long term, with the employment of civilians in areas of menial labour such as sanitation. It may now be necessary to consider contracting out the menial civilian jobs to a firm and employ highly skilled civilians in specialised areas who will also serve as teachers and instructors for skills transfer. Further, the policy was meant to preclude the employment of civilians between the ages of 18-25 who were eligible for recruitment and military training. These policies have not been rigorously applied.

Retirees represent 8.28% of the force's strength, a situation that has spiraled out of control over the last 10 years. The re-enlistment of retirees stifles growth, falsely inflates actual strength figures and deprives the Force of available manpower for active, hazardous duty. While recognising that some retirees may possess skills that the force requires, they place the GDF in the precarious position of having temporary employees in permanent positions. Further, there is no legal authority to support embodiment of retirees. Their colour service is already spent. However, if such skills are deemed necessary by a competent Force Board then such a category of a service can either be extended or the rank promoted if there is such a vacancy and or such person is employed on a new contract as a civilian staff. In any event the Force should disembodify its retirees and create necessary vacancies for new and young blood into its ranks.

Numbers The military establishment over the decade 1975-1985 was at an all high. This was a direct response to Venezuela's overt acts of aggression as a surrogate of the capitalist world during the years of the Cold war. However, Guyana's renunciation

of socialism in 1985 and the end of the cold war four years later saw a lessening of political tension and Venezuela's de-escalation of forces in close proximity to the frontier with Guyana. Further, the Structural Adjustment Programme undertaken by the government of Guyana and calls for an 'affordable army' resulted in significant reductions in military spending over the period 1985-1992, severely shrinking the military establishment to levels not consistent with the GDF's role and tasks. Political change in 1992 did not witness any early significant change in the fortunes of the GDF. The new government, while claiming that they were committed to financial arrangements that pre-dated their ascendancy to office, barely concealed their distrust *initially* of this organisation which they felt played a significant role in denying them political power over the years. Today, much to our credit, we have renewed and demonstrated able confidence in us by the Government. Our numbers must constantly bear relationship to our neighbors' military posture. We must, at all times, effectively resource our units in order to effectively define aggression especially with recent military development on our continent.

Source and location of human resources Traditionally, the GDF drew significant numbers from the lower Corentyne, West Coast Berbice and Essequibo coast. These ordinary members in the mid 1980's to early 1990's possessed a basic primary education since the GDF at the time was unable to effectively compete with the private sector and suffered as a consequence. However, economic and other factors resulting in an increased unemployment rate have allowed the GDF to attract applicants who are better qualified over the last 10 years. The numbers of recruits drawn from Georgetown and areas along the lower East Coast and West Demerara have increased. But, as pointed out earlier, the Force gains its recruits primarily from the African Guyanese communities even though recruitment is effectively conducted throughout the length and breath of Guyana.

ANALYSIS OF HUMAN RESOURCES

Consideration of our human resource pool suggest that even as the national debate on increasing the retirement age continues the Guyana Defence Force should conduct a detailed study of the benefits of increasing the retirement age of ordinary ranks to 45, middle level Officers and Warrant Officers to 50 and senior Officers to 60 years. One obvious benefit would be the retention of skills needed to rebuild the organisation while obviating the need to re-enlist retirees. The percentage ratios show that civilians and retirees comprise close to 22% percent of the Force while females and retirees comprise close to 19% of the Force. The three groups represent- admitting that retired females are a mere 2% of their total- close to 29% percent of the Force. When one considers this total in the context of combat capability then it is clear that our human resource is imbalanced and our ability to execute our tasks remain extremely difficult. A deeper analysis needs to be done as to why some ethnic groups are not drawn to voluntary service in the military. Following this exercise, measures need to be adopted to make the military more attractive to these groups at the national level.

The organisation suffered major attrition and downsizing with the return to democracy

and lessening of tensions on our western frontier. However, a free and open society has led to other challenges where some groups and individuals are seemingly bent on violating the rights to others; this includes serious crimes committed by armed individuals. An overtasked police force, poverty, tacit political support and past intransigence of the military may have led to the criminal upsurge. The rebuilding of capacity within the military coinciding with an atmosphere of improved civil military relations must translate into increased support for the police and suppression/eradication of armed criminal gangs. The recruitment pattern has shown a shifting trend with more soldiers being drawn from urban centers, wards of Georgetown and Linden. It has been recognised that many new soldiers have been attracted to the organisation for the wrong reasons and are not committed to service. Additionally, the soldiers recruited from the urban centers are more prone to deviancy including criminal acts and drug abuse. If the GDF is to continue to draw from this pool then the organisation must seek ways of positively influencing potential candidates long before their recruitment through social programs in urban and coastal communities.

The rebuilding of capacity within the military coinciding with an atmosphere of improved civil military relations must translate into increased support for the police and suppression/eradication of armed criminal gangs.

NETWORKING AND LEVERAGING

The GDF, over the years, has been able to forge partnerships with other organisations both internally and externally in the pursuit of its mission. Some relationships have a basis in law and provide for coordination between the Force and other local agencies. The Force coordinates with the Ministry of Agriculture under the Fisheries Act which provides for Coast Guard Officers to act as Fisheries Officers. It also coordinates with the Lands and Surveys Commission in terms of Guyana's Maritime Boundaries and with the Guyana Police Force, Customs and Customs Anti Narcotic Unit (CANU) under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic substances Act. The Force also collaborates with the Environmental Protection Agency under the Environmental Protection Act and other symbiotic relationships have been developed in the area of information gathering and include agencies and groups that compliment the Forces' efforts such as Guyana Geology and Mines Commission (GGMC), Guyana Gold and Diamond Miners Association (GGDMA), Forestry Commission, Aircraft Owners' association, Police, Amerindian communities particularly the Wai-Wais of south eastern Guyana and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Other local institutions with which the GDF share special relationships are the Ministry of Education and technical schools from which it draws its members. The GDF also maintains links to local communities and groups through the 2nd Infantry Battalion (Reserve) formerly the People's Militia, which operates in several regions across the country.

Other critical linkages are external in nature and they span several bilateral and other associations such as:

- **Intelligence sharing and co-operation** These bilaterals allow for cooperation in the field of intelligence sharing and training with the Brazilians and to a lesser extent the Venezuelan Armed Forces. No formal structure exists for such exchanges with the Surinamese military. There is certainly a need to establish and maintain defence attachés with these primary countries that would act as the nation's defence diplomats and create an environment of détente on our borders. These attachés should be permanent in these countries in order to effectively maximise the benefits of direct defence diplomacy.
- **Military training assistance programmes** These allow for local personnel to receive training based on annual grants given by the United States, United Kingdom and the Canadian Armed Forces, in the main. Limited training is also available in India, Brazil and more recently, China. Under the traditional military assistance programmes local personnel were trained in the United States, United Kingdom and Canada and also "in country" by foreign training teams. A number of joint training and exercises were conducted in Guyana, especially with the French, British and the United States. In some instances the use of local training areas allowed for payment to the local military or the provision of kit and equipment in lieu of such payment. However, only on a very limited scale existed some training exchanges.

Bilateral arrangements within the CARICOM region allow for training of soldiers of other CARICOM territories in Guyana, training of Guyanese personnel in Barbados and Jamaica, provision of local instructors to the Jamaica Defence Force, annual participation of local troops in Exercise Trade Winds organised by the Regional Security System (RSS) in regional territories, participation of local Officers and soldiers in an annual company size exchange involving UK forces and the Jamaica Defence Force.

In the context of a wider regional arrangement the Guyana Defence Force participates in Caribbean Command Competitions which involves the military organisations of the wider Caribbean. This biennial competition takes in the Dutch, French Caribbean, Suriname, USA and UK. There are also exchanges between French forces (Guyane) and the GDF.

ANALYSIS OF NETWORKING AND LEVERAGING

The GDF is one of the few local organisations with such extensive and well-developed links locally, regionally and internationally and has often shared the benefits of this cooperation with other local agencies such as the police. Consideration of local and external networks highlighted the need for a new level of relationship with organisations possessing available assets. While recognising the need to acquire

surface vessels and aircraft of its own, the GDF must formalise arrangements for support by local aircraft and surface vessel owners in emergencies. Revitalising of partnerships and intelligence/information sharing meetings including the Regional Intelligence Committees will significantly enhance confidence in the security sector. Revitalising the 2 Infantry Battalion (Reserve) with the active involvement of regional authorities along with a renewed effort to promote dialogue and information exchange with the Suriname National Army will add to the certainty of our efforts.

While recognising the need to acquire surface vessels and aircraft of its own, the GDF must formalise arrangements for support by local aircraft and surface vessel owners in emergencies. Revitalising partnerships and intelligence/information sharing meetings including the Regional Intelligence Committees will significantly enhance confidence in the security sector.

The removal of the financial impediment that affected the acceptance of skill and command courses offered by the Brazilian Military and re-negotiation of the per diem allowance for attendance on military courses and related duty overseas are bound to impact positively on our human resource enhancement. The Force will continue to rely on foreign Subject Matter Experts and Exchanges to build local training capability while investing in the development of the Training Corps as a center of excellence and regional training institution for Officers and NCOs. The Force must be able to leverage its human and materiel resources within its operational environment. Statecraft partnerships and strategic partnerships with State and non-State actors represent positive ways for the Force's human and materiel resources to integrate and impact on its development.

The Guyana Defence Force must work towards participating in other UN missions overseas. This would raise the profile of the organisation as a troop contributing country and qualify serving Officers to fill future posts in United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations.

ANALYSIS OF ORGANISATION STRUCTURE AND TRAINING

A careful study of the organisation structure of the Guyana Defence Force would indicate that it focused primarily on ranks and appointments, in the main, of our human resource personnel. Its core product is the Force's Establishment. This document simply summarises the ranks of the Force. It is a tool that allows us knowledge of quantities as it relates to our personnel. The nature of this type of establishment denudes the Force of critical information necessary for its human resource development and excludes information relating to: skill sets for Officers and other ranks, weapons of all types, equipment of all types, vehicles, aircraft and vessels. The Force's establishment must be able to reflect a total projection of the Force's requirements. It must be flexible and ready to satisfy peace as well as combat expectations.

Training the soldier in the Force has revolved around the 'rotation concept' which

meant that an officer and or other rank would be posted to Training Corps as an Instructor for a particular course or courses and then rotate out to his or parent Unit. The 'instructor' received limited instructor training or any 'train the trainer' training or, further, any 'train the trainer to train' training. Neither did any of the Instructors receive any training in course designing and courseware development. The only and normal instructor exposure the officer and other rank is afforded is the Force's Staff Training module which is a prerequisite before any officer or other rank is allowed to instruct at Training Corps. However, the purpose of Staff Training is not to produce

the purpose of Staff Training is not to produce an instructor but rather to sharpen the instructor's skills and update him/her as to new methodologies. In addition, it acts as a final clearance house for confirmation on instruction materials, completion of lesson planning and instructor/student notes.

an instructor but rather to sharpen the instructor's skills and update him/her as to new methodologies in addition to acting as a final clearance house for confirmation on instruction materials, completion of lesson planning and instructor/student notes. Instructors must receive formal training and properly certified to instruct. At the end of the Force's current staff training module the graduate can only be considered to be a 'trainee instructor.'

It is now necessary to determine how many student contact hours an instructor has to achieve in order for him/her to be considered for evaluation to be an instructor in the Force. And it is also necessary for the Force to determine how many 'Instructor Supervisor Sessions' the trainee instructor has to undergo before he/she is considered for evaluation as an instructor in the Force. These contact and session hours must be recorded by the Training Corps and a duly certified signature must appear verifying the hours and authorising the officer or other rank to instruct. Without this verification and certification all persons instructing shall be considered 'trainee instructors'. These standards should apply to all generic and specialist training institutions within the Force. It therefore means that a certified instructor is authorised to wear an instructor's badge and receive all pecuniary benefits throughout his military career.

The underpinning philosophy is that training should be role specific. It may very well be necessary to consider a rethink of the concept of the 'multidimensional soldier'- a concept that drove our training needs over the years. Multidimensional skills require spending more training dollars on one soldier to produce a crack trooper. We have spent the funds but the evidence does not show sufficient results to afford success. A great negative factor seems to be the inability of the soldier to be an effective student of this concept. It may be considerably more effective to spend the training dollar on one specialty per soldier thereby spreading the training dollar and, only where necessary as in the case of Special Forces, multiple skills are imparted in the soldier. The Force must also provide academic training to its Officers and ranks. Each Officer and Other Rank must be able to train up to the University level. But the Academic Education Programme (AEP) must be organised in a phased and tiered manner so

as to prepare our soldiers to complete CXC level examinations. Our soldiers should spend no more than five years completing the AEP and it must be seen as a second opportunity to complete secondary school. A Force Training Doctrine has to be produced which speaks to all aspects of training.

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ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES

The GDF as a public entity receives its revenue from allocations in the national budget. As previously mentioned, the GDF's budget from 1985 was slashed under the nebulous concept of 'an affordable army' introduced by the previous government. These cuts were based on guidelines set by the International Monetary Fund and other multi-national lending institutions that financed the Economic Recovery Programme. The reduced spending policy set a cap on recurrent and capital expenditure, which affected emoluments and other maintenance costs and consequently reduced numbers. Capital budget allocations over the period 1989-2000 reflected less than 1% of national allocations which negatively affected the Force's ability to recapitalise and acquire new equipment. These allocations were also eroded by reduced dollar rates against the US dollar (devaluation) and rising prices (inflation). The impact on the Force's development through reduced budgetary allocations can be viewed through different periods and resource combinations.

CURRENT AND CAPITAL BUDGETS FROM 1970 TO 2007

Current Over the years in review the Guyana Defence Force Current Budget moved from \$6.464M in 1970 to \$73.8m in 1984, an increase of \$67.424m, while the Capital budget moved from \$0.068m in 1970 to \$G 5.045m during the same period, an increase of \$G 4.98m. Notably, however, were significant increases during the period 1975 to 1977 in both budgets and significant decreases in 1978: *See Illustration 5 – GDF Nominal Expenditure 1970 to 1984*. During the period 1985 to 2007 the Current Budget moved from \$G 113.526M in 1985 to \$G 4.2b in 2007, an increase of \$G 4.08b. On the capital side there were significant increases in the years 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2005 to \$G 460.795m, \$G 971.216m, \$G 244.965m and \$G 183.902m respectively: *See Illustration 6 - GDF total Nominal expenditure 1985 to 2007*. In addition, there were increases every year during the period in relation to current budget allocations with exception of 1977, 1984, 1987, 1996 and 2003 which had decreased over the previous years. It is apposite to note that the difference between the current and capital allocations over the years 1970 to 2007 expanded exponentially in favour of current budgetary allocations: *See Illustrations 5 and 6*.

Capital The capital budget experienced yearly increases from 1970 to 1976

representing a period of significant growth between 1974 and 1976 peaking in 1976 at approximately \$G21.6m (\$US 8.6m). However, it declined from its peak in 1976 of \$G 21.6m to almost zero in 1980 and then showed slight increases until 1984 averaging funds per year at approximately \$G 4.5m (\$US 1.7m). Between 1985 and 1993 there was no real increase in capital funding to the Force averaging a mere \$G 50.0m per year. From 1993 to 1999 it increased slightly peaking at approximately \$G 100m (\$US0.6m) in 1993. There was a dramatic increase in the period 2000 to 2001 with a maximum of approximately \$G 1.0b (\$US 5.3m) being allocated in 2001. From 2002 to 2007 capital funding to the Force decreased to an average constant amount of \$G 120m (\$US 0.6m): *See Illustrations 6 and 7.*

Over a period of thirty years there were only two periods of significant increases in capital funding to the Force - 1974 to 1976 and 2000 to 2001. In 1976 it was \$US 8.6m and in 2001 it was \$US 4.7. Quite clearly the Force never received on the capital side after 1976 any real increase in its capital allocation. The acquisition of the Force's fast patrol boat and its off shore patrol craft represent the major capital acquisition during these respective periods. Other smaller patrol craft, helicopters and weapons were acquired through government to government barter arrangements and could not reflect as a significant capital inflow into the Force's budget. Naturally, our ability to acquire and upgrade our military assets was stymied by the capital allocations provided to the Force over the years. Real growth in the Force will only result from increased capital allocations as the two are inextricably bound up.

It is apposite to note that the difference between the current and capital allocations over the years 1970 to 2007 expanded exponentially in favour of current budgetary allocations: *See Illustrations 5 and 6.*

Naturally, our ability to acquire and upgrade our military assets was stymied by the capital allocations provided to the Force over the years. Real growth in the Force will only result from increased capital allocations as the two are inextricably bound together.

CAPITAL COMPARED WITH EMPLOYMENT COSTS/OTHER CHARGES

The Guyana Defence Force Capital Allocation over the years 1970 to 1984 fluctuated with a peak in 1976 of \$G 21.661m, a downward trend in 1977 and 1978 to \$G 8.737m and \$G 0.985m respectively. Between 1979 and 1984, it continued to fluctuate and was at \$G 5.045m in 1984. During the period 1985 to 2007 GDF capital continued to fluctuate although there were significant increases in the years between 2000 and 2005. Concurrently, budgetary allocation for employment costs during 1970 to 1984 increased on a yearly basis and moved from \$G 4.222m in 1970 to \$G 38.595m (\$US 9.3m) in 1984 an increase of \$G 34.373m except for 1978 and 1984 when there were decreases to \$G 2.607m and \$G 6.775m respectively. From 1985 to 2007,

budgetary allocation for employment costs took an upward step and moved from \$G 54.960m (\$US 13.2m) in 1985 to \$G 2.201b (\$US 11.01m) in 2007, an increase of \$G 2.146b with no yearly decrease during that period. But the real value of the increase was reduced significantly. Salaries were valued less in 2007 than in 1985. From 1984 to 1991 the increases were almost constant but increased sharply from 1991 to 2007 reflecting no doubt inflation compensation and the effects of an increased devalued Guyana dollar. See *Illustration 8 - GDF's capital expenditure compared with employment costs and other charges*.

The Guyana Defence Force was forced to grow very slowly due to restricted capital inflows and necessary recapitalisation suffered while at the same time real wages dropped lowering the standard of living of the members of the Force. The Force was unable to maintain a known strategic advantage with its eastern neighbour and the consequent reduced effort in successful defence diplomacy also suffered. Today we experience the full effects of budgetary restrictions to the Force as it relates to our eastern neighbour.

The Guyana Defence Force was forced to grow very slowly due to restricted capital inflows and necessary recapitalisation suffered. At the same time real wages dropped lowering the standard of living of the members of the Force.

From 1970 to 1984, "other charges" budgetary allocation fluctuated upwards from \$G 3.761m (\$US 0.6m) in 1970 to \$G 35.293m (\$US 8.5m) in 1984. This was a tremendous increase for the Force resulting in significant provision of materiel for the members of the Force while from 1985 to 2007 the allocation was increased from \$G 58.566m (\$US 14.1m) in 1985 - representing another significant increase - other charges were further increased in 2007 to \$G 2.098b (\$US 10.3m) an increase of \$G 2.039b but a decrease in real terms. Again these significant increases were necessary for inflation correction against an increased devalued dollar and little real increase occurred.

DISTRIBUTION OF OTHER CHARGES/EMPLOYMENT COSTS/CAPITAL

During the period 1985 to 2007 employment costs received the highest allocation with "other charges" being second and capital the least. However, the divisions of the capital budget during the same period showed that funds were given only for buildings and equipment from 1970 to 1985 with equipment receiving the majority except in 1970, 1979 and 1983. It is clear that our biggest cost centre is employment which now represents 50 % of the Force's budget whereas capital represents a mere 4 % of the Force's budget. However, from 1986 the GDF received capital funds for other capital expenditure such as pure water supply and agri development. Significantly, the Force, from 1998, was able to acquire funds specific to marine development and later, from 2002, specific to infrastructure. Even though these allocations are almost constant in value other critical areas of the Force enjoyed new growth which improved quality of life for all: See *Illustrations 9,10,11,12 and 13 - Line Items Nominal Expenditure, 1985 -2007*.

In 1985 the Force's budget comprised four critical areas

- employment 31%
- other charges 33%
- equipment 34% and
- capital (buildings) 2%

There was no allocation for infrastructure, agri development, marine development works or pure water supply: *See Illustration 9 - Distribution – Other Charges/ Employment Costs/ Capital 1985*. By 1992 employment costs rose to 44% of the total budget with other charges at 55% and buildings (capital) at 1%: *See Illustration 10 - Distribution – Other Charges/ Employment Costs/ Capital 1992*. It is clear that the steep rise in employment costs due to inflation and an increased devalued Guyana dollar resulted in a natural concomitant increase in other charges as the two are interwoven. There was an allocation for marine development but negligible in amount to create any significant impact.

In 2002 employment costs comprised 54% of the Force's budget with other charges at 38%, significantly less than required to manage the Force. However, in order to provide a more diversified capital profile, 1% of the budget was allocated to buildings, 5% to equipment, 1% to infrastructure and 1% to marine development works totalling 8% to capital. By 2007 employment remained high at 50%, other charges at 48 % with capital at 2% - buildings 1% and equipment 1%. Of note is that agricultural development works, marine development, pure water supply and infrastructure, though allocations were made, were insufficient to impact the percentage allocation under capital: *See Illustrations 11, 12 and 13*. These figures show that over the period 1985 to 2002 the current side of the budget enjoyed inflation correction but the capital side of the budget remained constant evidencing no discernible correction for inflation, let alone, real increases: *See Illustration 14 - No real income in budget for 21 years*.

COMPARISON OF GUYANA INFLATION RATE 1985 TO 2007 WITH GDF % CHANGE

Between 1986 and 1990 Inflation rate rose to over 110%. In 1991 and 1992 it reduced to 90% and 25% respectively and continued to fluctuate over the period 1993 to 2007. Inflation rate stood at 14% in 2007. The GDF percentage increase on the other hand in relation to the National Budget did not move in proportion to inflation rate. In 1985 the GDF percent on the National Budget was 11.3%, in 1986 4.44% and from 1987 to 2007 the percentage fluctuated. At the end of 2007 the percentage increase against the National Budget was 4%. In 1985 the total Force's budget stood at \$G 176,587,000.00 which represented a value of (\$US 42.5 m)⁵. By 2007 the Force's budget rose to \$G 4.5b which represents a value of (\$US 22.5m). Clearly this represents a significant decrease in real value. There were numerical increases in budgetary allocations which created an illusion of increase when in fact it was

⁵ Bank of Guyana Figures for US rate of exchange: 1975/6- \$US 2.55 , 1980 -\$US2.55, 1981/83-\$US 3.0, 1984 -\$US 4.19, 1990 - \$US 45.0, 2001 - \$US189, 2002 - \$US 191.7, 2007- \$US 203.5. Bank of Guyana Figures for US rate of exchange: 1975/6- \$US 2.55 , 1980 -\$US2.55, 1981/83-\$US 3.0, 1984 -\$US 4.19, 1990 - \$US 45.0, 2001 - \$US189, 2002 - \$US 191.7, 2007- \$US 203.5.

a decrease in real allocation. See *Illustration 15 - Inflation rates and percentage change in budgetary expenditure*.

Illustration 15 also shows that there was no real increase in our budget from 1986 to 2007- a period of 21 years. Inflation values were also greater than the average budget per year over this period. This means that the Force was unable to grow in real terms due to budget suppression. The Force remained in survival mode over this period and actually received less in real terms over the years due to the inflation rate. If we are to build a professional and credible Force to maintain Guyana's territorial and maritime integrity then it is necessary that

Inflation values were also greater than the average budget per year over this period. This means that the Force was unable to grow in real terms due to budget suppression. The Force remained in survival mode over this period and actually received less in real terms over the years due to the inflation rate

our budgetary allocation in real terms be increased. See *Illustration 16 which shows the interrelationship between the Force's budgetary allocation and inflation rates*.

GDF EXPENDITURE ON SOME MAJOR LINE ITEMS/OTHER CHARGES

During 1985 to 2007 the major line items increased from \$G 44.566m in 1986 to \$G 1,345b in 2007. From 1998 to 2007 dietary was the highest expenditure, followed closely by 'others' and fuel in the third position. There were several increases and decreases on each expenditure during the period. Dietary, others and fuel were given priority over the other expenditure thus ensuring that the soldiers had adequate meals, clothes, equipment and fuel for movement of transport by land, sea and air.

During the period 1985 to 1990 the Force was allocated in almost equal proportions sums for dietary, fuel, field materials and a much higher percentage for the sub-head 'others'. These four categories are critical for the maintenance of the Force's personnel. Between 1990 and 1997 the Force was allocated increasing amounts on fuel, field materials and 'others' while dietary remained stable. Obviously, in an inflation driven environment stable allocations in dietary would have resulted in severe hardships to the men and women of the Force. Allocation under 'others' by 1995 began to decrease impacting the Force's ability to sustain itself in acquiring accommodation stores and kit and equipment: See *Illustration 18 - GDF Expenditures on some Major Items - Other Charges - 1985-2007*.

By 1997 the Force's budget for dietary increased sharply and continued to increase through 2007. In 1993 the Force expended by allocation approximately \$G 100m on dietary equivalent to \$US 2.2m. In 2007 its allocation approximates to \$G 450m on dietary equivalent to \$US 2.2m, no discernible increase and certainly no evidence of any correction for inflation. It is obvious that the Force is asked to feed itself at the same cost it fed itself fourteen (14) years ago.

Bearing in mind that there has been no real increase in budgetary allocations to the Force, the corresponding increases in the four critical areas identified earlier posed a significant difficulty for the survival of the Force. In the result, priority went to feeding, accommodating and clothing the Force, fuelling the Force's transport and providing field materials for the Force in that order from 1987 through to 2007. *Illustration 18 clearly shows that spending patterns from 1985 to 2007 and the corresponding increases in dietary.* Over the years the real value of money decreased and at the same time prices rose significantly. In the process the budgetary allocations had to be shifted to deal with the survival areas (dietary and clothing) with corresponding under allocation for the other critical areas. On the current side this under allocation resulted in the inability of the Force to train and equip the Officers and soldiers to effectively maintain the territorial and maritime integrity of the nation.

It must be commendable to the Force to have maintained its core skills notwithstanding the financial challenges. However there are huge technology, equipment upgrade and human capacity development gaps that require more real allocations in our budget.

GDF PERCENTAGE ALLOCATION OF THE NATIONAL BUDGET

The National Budget increased from \$G 176.108m in 1970 to \$G 109.916b in 2007, while the GDF budget increased from \$G 6.463m in 1970 to \$G 4.453b in 2007. Although GDF budget increased yearly over the years except for 1984, 1986, 1987 and 2003, the increases were not in proportion with the National Budget. However, devaluation of the dollar and high inflation rates resulted in no real increases and, in the main, a real decrease in real value of budgetary allocations to the Force. Instead, the GDF budget against the National budget moved from proportion of 11.3% in 1985 to 4.05% in 2007. In 1985 it rose to its highest 11.3% but declined constantly until 1992 to 1.4% and up to 4.05% in 2007. *See Illustrations 20, 21 and 22.* This has naturally resulted in reduced capability both human and physical in defence posturing. It must be commendable to the Force to have maintained its core skills notwithstanding the financial challenges. However there are huge technology, equipment upgrade and human capacity development gaps that require more real allocations in our budget.

Expenses The GDF, like any other organisation of its type, is a huge spender. Significant sub-heads of expenditure include rations, pay and allowances, operations and training and transportation, with the latter - in the capacity of hire - invariably being a quite contentious and hotly debated issue. While the GDF has few trucks of its own and has been repeatedly denied 'capital' to make purchases, the government continues yearly to dole out funds under 'current' for the hire of vehicles. The absence of organic transportation acts as a 'combat divider' and places the Force at risk in its pursuit of its mission. Civilian contracted drivers are generally unsuited for military duty. Confidentiality and surprise are often disregarded in order to secure the hire. The Guyana Defence must return to owning its own fleet of land transport which will act as a Force multiplier in the execution of its missions.

Cost Recovery This concept was introduced within the Air Corps to allow for the rental of GDF air assets for commercial purposes in order to garner funds to maintain the fleet. This novel approach was adopted based on government's inability to provide sufficiently for the unit's needs, but placed the GDF in competition and confrontation with the private aircraft owners' association. Conflict arose as a result of lower commercial rates offered by the GDF, a result of subsidised fuel. Further, without commercial insurance the GDF's operation of a commercial service provides risks to civilian passengers. There is a matter being litigated as in the case of the death of a passenger in 1987. Albeit governmental policy, commercial operations of the Air fleet should not be conducted as a cost recovery for the maintenance of the Air Corps but rather to leverage the economics of the aviation industry. The Force must also explore orthodox methods of increasing the remuneration of its aviation staff other than paying such remuneration from commercial earnings. This is necessary to avoid the 'fly as much as I can and as hard as I can' syndrome. In any event this system of extra, but necessary remuneration, from commercial earnings may very well result in extra tight maintenance schedules to keep the Force's aircraft in the air principally to satisfy extra remunerative needs. There is also the ever present danger of unfair 'unit influenced' categorisation of a commercial flight versus an operational flight – bearing in mind that operational flights yield no commercial dollars and therefore no engineer and or flight pay.

Considerations Defence and budgetary allocation must be viewed together. There are inextricably bound up. Training, capital and skills acquisition cycles are long and require continued funding for effective upgrade and or replacement. Real defence dollars contribute to effective defence diplomacy. The Guyana Defence Force is a defence postured organisation. It is trained to detect and identify aggression and relay this critical information timely to the Executive for defence diplomacy to take effect. It is not established as a Force that practices a first strike. Any posture less than that of a defence force would render the Force useless to the nation.

The recapitalisation of the Force is essential to achieve increases in air, land and maritime mobility which are crucial to our defence policy of defining aggression. Part of our defence policy must include parity of defence capability with at least one of Guyana's neighbours. The Defence Board must see this as a productive endeavor as it also provides the necessary support mechanisms for the Force to operate in support of the Police. Guyana's development will ultimately depend on a secure environment and the Force stands to contribute to that reality so long as it is afforded to capitalise over the short to medium term. The financial management system of the Force is a centralized one. For greater efficiency the financial and logistic systems must be de-centralised and service driven. Financial services must be seen as a product to be delivered to the Officers and soldiers. A decentralised financial and logistics system would certainly provide greater management of the preparation and execution of the Force's capital and current expenditure projects.

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All Charts were Generated by GDF




Illustration 5 - GDF Nominal Expenditures, 1970 to 1984




Illustration 6 - GDF Total Nominal Expenditures, 1985 to 2007

GDF's Capital Expenditure compared with Employment Costs and Other Charges




Illustration 7 - GDF Capital Expenditure compared with Employment Cost and Other Charges

Line Items Nominal Expenditures, 1985-2007




Illustration 8 - Line Items Nominal Expenditures, 1985- 2007

Distribution-Other Charges/Employment Costs/Capital 1985




Illustration 9 - Distribution – Other Charges/Employment Cost/Capital 1985

Distribution-Other Charges/Employment Costs/Capital 1992




Illustration 10 - Distribution – Other Charges/Employment Cost/Capital 1992

Distribution-Other Charges/Employment Costs/Capital 2001




Illustration 11 - Distribution Other Charges/Employment Cost/Capital 2001

Distribution-Other Charges/Employment Costs/Capital 2002




Illustration 12 - Distribution Other Charges/Employment Costs/Capital 2002

Distribution-Other Charges/Employment Costs/Capital 2007




Illustration 13 - Distribution Other Charges/Employment Costs/Capital 2007




Illustration 14 - Budget Increases, 1986 to 2007




Illustration 15 - Inflation Rates, 1986 to 2007




Illustration 16 - National Inflation Rates vs Increase in % Change in GDF Other Charges, 1985 to 2007

Nominal Trend of Other Charges Allocations -GDF




Illustration 17 - Nominal Trend of Other Charges Allocations, 1970 to 1984

GDF's EXPENDITURES ON SOME MAJOR LINE ITEMS- OTHER CHARGES




Illustration 18 - GDF Expenditures on some Major Items - Other Charges, 1985 to 2007

Nominal Trend in Other Charges Allocations-GDF




Illustration 19 - Nominal Trend in Other Charges Allocations, 1985 to 2007

Comparison of GDF and Social Sector % of National Budget




Illustration 20 - Comparison of GDF and Social Sector % of National Budget, 2000 to 2007




Illustration 21 - GDF % Allocation of National Budget, 1985 to 2007




Illustration 22 - GDF % National Budget Comparison

PART III

Challenges, Results and Recommendations

- **Politicisation** Perceptions of political meddling with the internal management structure of the organisation may linger for some time among persons within and without the organisation. The view that the government has installed a team of 'politically reliable' individuals may negatively affect support for internal anti crime operations particularly in some coastal communities. A continued apolitical stance is still the best course for the Force.
- **Ethnic Balance** Interference to create artificial balances and thus satisfy a particular ethnic group through affirmative action may be both unpopular and unproductive. Unless persons are voluntarily attracted to the organisation unreasonable incentives may have to be provided to retain their services.
- **Political Instability** Continued political instability and an under resourced police force will invariably result in the Force being called upon to support the police in law enforcement. While recognising the dangers of enticement of public officials and the divisive political environment, any prolonged coastal deployment outside a permanent organisational structure could result in the tainting of individuals and unrelenting media scrutiny.
- **Mission Creep** This is a euphemistic expression given by the military to the extension of missions without corresponding increases in resource allocation. While the government seems intent on involving the GDF in internal security matters, this involvement without additional resources, training or orientation will ultimately impair the GDF's ability to discharge its primary role.
- **Budget** While the budget was seemingly used as an instrument to fashion the behavior of the GDF in the past, these cuts had a severe and debilitating effect. In the absence of re-capitalization, use of obsolete equipment will result in accidents, deaths and mediocrity. To this must be added the psychological dimension involving frustration, lowering of morale and attrition. It should be noted that we have now turned the corner in our civil-military relationship.
- **Socio-economic Factors** A crumbling education system will pose challenges to this organisation. Increased reliance on Information Technology and new technologies would necessitate the recruitment of soldiers of a certain level of intelligence and education. However, in a situation of diminishing results from the education system, the Force may be unable to compete effectively in the labour market with private enterprises. Further, persons trained for our needs will be exposed to the financial lure of the external environment. The Guyana Defence Force must deliver academic education at least up to undergraduate level for all of its ranks, especially its soldiers.
- **Health System** As health care becomes more expensive in the society and

with significant challenges to the health care system as a whole, the Guyana Defence Force which seeks to recruit young, healthy adults will be faced with a human resource challenge if the numbers of persons fit for military service nationally is further reduced. In this context, the Force must seek solutions to keep its human resource healthy. A contributory medical insurance scheme is likely to provide health care beyond the primary care that the Force provides for each military officer and soldier. In this way a soldier or officer can add his or her family as beneficiaries under an expanded contributory medical insurance scheme.

- **Other Challenges** High levels of retention over the past years and unchecked promotions resulted in a bottleneck at the top of the organisation structure. This led to increased competition, conflict and reduced esprit de corps. However, the changes in the leadership structure will again fuel competition at levels below while it will expose new and younger Officers to command of units and sub-units. Without a reduction in the operational tempo more effort must be placed in monitoring the performances of these units.

RESULTS

The output of the Force can be measured in this way:

- Surveillance of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), airspace and borders.
- Patrols of the EEZ, borders, internal waterways and harbours.
- Operations designed to:
 - Reduce smuggling.
 - Expel foreign miners.
 - Arrest rustlers.
 - Counter narcotics trafficking and possible production.
 - Search and Rescue.
 - Arrest of pirates.
- Coastal operations in support of the police to counter crime and maintain law and order.
- Medical outreaches.
- Urban and coastal community activities.
- Deployment of Rapid Response Teams.
- Conduct of transition and interdiction operations.

These outputs translate into positive social benefits such as:

- Reducing acts of poaching, rustling, smuggling, illegal fishing and drug trafficking.
- Reduction of acts of piracy in the Harbours directed against foreign commercial vessels and against local commercial fishermen in near coastal waters.
- Control of illegal Brazilian gold miners and economic migrants.
- Reduction of 'spectacular' crimes involving sophisticated weaponry.

- Reporting of air space/territorial violations and consequent diplomatic actions taken against errant neighboring states.

The cumulative result will be a positive impact on the Guyanese populace in the areas of:

- Maintenance of peace and stability internally.
- Improved public morale.
- A conscious sense of security and well being as a nation.
- Deterring of acts of aggression by Venezuela and Suriname.
- Consolidation of national values and interests.

CONCLUSION

The Guyana Defence Force stands at a critical juncture in its history. It now enjoys more confidence from the Government and must continue to act in a manner that earns the respect of the people that it serves. The Force's immediate and strategic goals are achievable where specific programmes are funded and maintained. The Force must remain a-political and Officers and ranks must strive to regenerate professional standards which, in itself, contribute positively to enhanced civil-military relations.

Academic education and skills acquisition will be key to the regeneration of professional standards but the Force must be prepared to review its defence and administrative policies. There is always the constant of inadequate resources for the defence sector, however, careful planning and timely maintenance of equipment will serve as a multiplier. The Force must manage more effective combat efficiency ratios and train continuously in all areas, especially specialised training.

There is no doubt that crime, increasing food prices and security will continue to be top agenda items. Combating these threats require not only the regular forces but also military reserves and members of communities throughout the country. The Force will have to develop programmes to satisfy both the short and long term goals of the Guyana Defence Force.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following programmes are recommended to satisfy the short and long term goals of the Guyana Defence Force:

- Review and update existing threat assessments relevant to Brazil, Venezuela and Suriname.
- Review existing posture, operations on the border and associated manpower and physical assets.
- Develop strategies in association with other Law Enforcement agencies to combat the trafficking of drugs and guns entering the country through open

borders.

- Expand operations on major rivers, waterways, territorial sea and EEZ to reduce illicit activities and maintain sovereignty.
- Conduct a strategic defence review.
- Review of protocols and contingency plans to support the police and prison service in emergencies.
- Assessment of existing coastal locations/bases and development of forward operating bases with Quick Reaction Forces to support police and suppress serious armed criminal activity.
- Employing of MCID to develop intelligence related to the recovery of missing AK 47 rifles. MCID will also complement the Police SB/CID as a national intelligence/investigation body.
- Development of coordinated and joint strategy to combat and effectively eradicate piracy on major rivers and coastal areas.
- Continuation of support for law enforcement activity related to smuggling of fuel and trafficking in persons
- Develop capacity as the national search and rescue agency.
- Develop capacity to support and supplement the CDC in national emergencies.
- Conduct hearts and minds programmes in hinterland, coastal villages and urban communities.
- Sustain efforts to reduce and arrest deviant and criminal acts by serving members against the civilian population.
- Counter drug operations in support of Law Enforcement Agencies.
- Renouncing of the adversarial approach to civil-military relations.
- Commitment to reduce loss and waste and to improve accountability and transparency.
- Commitment to improving the quality of life for military members through better pay and conditions of service.
- Requesting the cessation of stringent control measures and return of authority once exercised by the Chief of Staff to the Defence Force.
- Maintaining regular and continuous interaction between the CIC and senior leadership of the Force.
- Regular hosting of Defence Board meetings with major input from the Defence Force in the development of the agenda.
- Improved screening of new entrants and continuous vetting of ranks over their period of service.
- Development of an effective Military Police company as a necessary instrument of the personnel services branch of the force.
- Review of the scales of punishment and system of correction for deviant soldiers.
- Development of additional compliance mechanisms to provide for impartial inspection and reporting of units.
- Increasing levels of competitiveness among units of the Force (drill, skill at arms, military knowledge, first aid, discipline reports and attendance.
- Re-stocking of front line and training munitions consistent with weapon systems and replacement of ammunition (field artillery) destroyed during the explosion

at Camp Groomes.

- Acquisition of secure and reliable communication equipment and the integration of combat net radio and computer systems to improve command and control. This is particularly relevant now in the context of small team operations on the coast in support of law enforcement
- Staffing of training and front line units with the best personnel available.
- Promotion of a rewards based system for upward mobility and growth.
- Increase the “teeth to tail” ratios (warriors: logisticians).
- Minimise civilian employment, significantly reduce recruitment of women and stop re-enlistment of retirees.
- Increase the strength and capability of the Coast Guard.
- Bring existing combat arms, combat support and combat service support units up to their approved strength.
- Establish a second regular battalion
- Redrafting of guidelines and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
- Strict compliance with SOPs.
- Development of personnel management systems that are based on merit and performance standards.
- Revitalising of partnerships and intelligence/information sharing meetings including the RICs.
- Revitalising of the 2 Infantry Battalion (Reserve) with the active involvement of regional authorities.
- A renewed effort to promote dialogue and information exchange with Suriname and Venezuelan national Armies.
- Removal of the financial impediment that affected the acceptance of skill and command courses offered by the Brazilian Military.
- Re-negotiation of the per diem allowance for attendance on military courses and related duty overseas.
- Continued reliance on foreign Subject Matter Experts and Exchanges to build local training capability.
- Investment in the development of the Training Corps as a center of excellence and regional training institution for Officers and NCO courses.
- Commitment to another UN mission overseas. This would raise the profile of the organisation as a troop contributing country and qualify serving Officers to fill future posts in UN DPKO.



